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INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Railway Labor Act (RLA)l in 1926 after a
long period of instability in relations between labor and management
in the railroad industry. The Act represented a fiercely negotiated
compromise among competing interests: the labor unions' interest in
preserving fair wages and working conditions, the railroads' interest in
carrying on profitable businesses, and the congressional interest in pro
tecting the flow of interstate commerce.
In keeping with one of the RLA's primary purposes of strength
ening the unions vis a vis the railroads, its drafters included provisions
intended to preserve the "exclusive representative" status of a union
selected as bargaining agent by the majority of a group of employees.
Another concept expressly espoused by the RLA is the prohibition
against "any limitation upon freedom of association among employ
ees."2 These two principles are simultaneously realized in the more
common circumstance of an employee who is a voluntary member of
1. Railway Labor Act of1926, ch. 347,44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982».
2. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982).
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the majority union and who seeks representation by the majority
union in either collective bargaining or grievance settling proceedings.
A conflict arises between the two principles, and between their
respective su~porting statutory provisions, however, in the case of a
non-union or minority union employee who seeks representation by a
minority union. While the statute clearly extends representation au
thoqty only to the majority union in collective bargaining,3 provisions
delineating the rights of individual employees to their choice of repre
sentation in grievance matters, particularly at company-level proceed
ings, are equivocal and subject to contrary interpretations. Before the
1988 Supreme Court decision in Landers v. National Railroad Passen
ger Corp.,4 several feder~l courts of appeals and district courts consid
ered the right of an individual employee to be' represented by a
minority union at a company-level grievance hearing. Faced with un
certain statutory language, the courts split evenly on the question of
whether such a right exists. Some courts decided that the employee
has an undeniable right under the RLA to invoke minority union rep
resentation. 5 Others found that the collective bargaining agent, as se
lected by the majority of employees, exercises the prerogative, through
the collective bargaining agreement, over when or whether an em
ployee may be represented by a minority union before a company-level
.
proceeding. 6
Through Landers, the Supreme Court sought finally to resolve
the conflict among the lower courts. The Court concluded that the
RLA does not entitle a railroad employee to representation by a union
other than the collective bargaining agent at company-level grievance
or disciplinary proceedings. 7 Landers adopted the view that, in the
context of company-level proceedings, the RLA requires that the ma
jority union's interest in preserving its exclusive representative status
prevail over the individual employee's right to choose a representative,
despite statutory language protecting both interests.
While the Landers interpretation of the RLA favors the majority
union, the alternative interpretation considered and rejected by the
Landers Court indulges the individual employee. Like the lower
courts before it, the Supreme Court did not recognize a middle
ground. This note suggests a third interpretation which secures the
3. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982).
4. 108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988). For a discussion of Landers, see infra notes 134-52 and
accompanying text.
5. For case citations, see infra notes 85, 89-101 and accompanying text.
6. For case citations, see infra notes 84, 102-33 and accompanying text.
7. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442-43.
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representation interests of both the majority and the individual. Com
pany-level grievance procedures can be implemented to recognize lim
ited minority union representation rights while preserving majority
union participation if the claim in question impacts the future of the
majority of employees. Such a representation scheme strikes the care
ful balance mandated by the spirit and letter of the Railway Labor
Act.
Part I of this note examines the historical roots of railway labor
legislation leading to the RLA's enactment. After identifying the stat
ute's "right to representation" provisions, Part I discusses the difficul
ties, resulting from ambiguity, of applying these provisions in the
context of grievance and disciplinary proceedings at the company
level. Part II reviews the longstanding contlict among the federal
courts interpreting these provisions, focusing on the rationales of the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and First Circuits in the
recent cases of Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Railroad 8 and Landers v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp.9 respectively. Part II then ~xam
ines the Supreme Court's approach in Landers.
Part III observes that while the courts denying minority union
representation, including the Supreme Court in Landers, have based
their decisions on persuasive statutorily-based arguments focusing on
the majority union's need to preserve its exclusive representative sta
tus, decisions permitting such representation have been no less persua
sive and no less consistent with the statute in citing provisions
protecting the individual employee's right to choose a representative.
Part III notes that the Landers Court fails to explain fully its disap
proval of the rationales of Taylor and other decisions supporting Tay
lor. Finally, Part III suggests that the RLA's statutory construction,
with language protecting the interests of both the majority union and
the individual employee, might best be served by a mechanism striking
an equitable balance between the two interests. While the Taylor in
terpretation ignores the exclusive representation provisions of the stat
ute, the Supreme Court's Landers decision similarly overlooks the
individual employee's statutory right to choose a representative.
Part IV suggests the application, by analogy, of the principles ex
pounded by the Supreme Court in the 1946 case of Elgin, Joliet &
8. 794 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986). For a discussion of
Taylor, see infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
9. 814 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988). For a discussion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, see infra notes 102-33 and accompa
nying text.
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Eastern Railway v. Burley,1O which upholds the right of an individual
employee to minority union representation at proceedings before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board. In Part IV, this note suggests
that the individual's rights identified in Burley are also recognizable in
the context of company-level proceedings. Finally, Part V proposes,
in the absence of clarifying legislation, a statutory interpretation based
on Burley which strikes a middle ground between Landers and Taylor
and which allocates representation authority between the individual's
minority union and the collective agent based on the collective or indi
vidualized aspects of the asserted grievance. I I

I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Railroads and Labor Legislation: Evolution to the Railway
Labor Act·

Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act l2 in 1887 in re
sponse to increasing public dissatisfaction with the railroad industry's
rate-setting practices. The statute achieved limited success in ade
quately regulating the railroads. Its passage, however, established, for
the first time, congressional power to regulate aspects of the railroad
industry critical to the national economy's well-being. 13 In Wabash,
St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois,14 the Supreme Court paved the
way for the congressional action by holding that only Congress could
set the rates of any railroad in interstate commerce. IS The federal in
terest in railroad regulation under the "commerce clause"16 soon ex
panded beyond merely establishing railroad rates. 17
Congress increasingly perceived railroad labor-management dis
putes as potentially interrupting the critically necessary national flow
of commerce. IS A sequence of serious nationwide railroad strikes fi
10. 325 U.s. 711 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
11. For an illustration of the steps in the proposed scheme, see infra note 239.
12. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
13. B. AARON, B. BURGOON, D. CULLEN, D. EISCHEN, M. KAHN, C. REHMUS, & J.
SEIDENBURG, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE
RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES 2 (C. Rehmus 2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter RLA AT
FIFTY].
14. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
15. Id. at 577 (overturning precedent vesting such power in the states).
16. The Constitution's commerce clause states in part: ."The Congress shall have
Power ... [to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. RLA AT FIFTY, supra note 13, at 3.

18. Id.
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nally led Congress to enact the Arbitration Act of 1888,19 the first
legislative intervention in the resolution of railway labor disputes.
Although its provisions were never invoked before its repeal, the
Arbitration Act presented significant new concepts to the area of labor
relations. Besides representing the first federal intervention into the
resolution of labor law disputes,20 the Arbitration Act introduced the
concept of voluntary arbitration. 21
Railway workers and the unions favored the Arbitration Act. At
the time, the railroads dominated the weaker labor organizations. The
unions, therefore, welcomed legislation enhancing their bargaining po
sition. 22 The statute, while buttressing the unions, also recognized
rights belonging to individual employees. It specifically identified "the
right of any employees engaged in the controversy" to participate in
the selection of their representatives in arbitration. 23
In 1894, President Cleveland invoked the governmental investiga
tory provisions of the Arbitration Act in an unsuccessful attempt to
avert the Pullman strike. 24 The Act's failure stirred Congress to enact
19. Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (1888).
20. 1. KAUFMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 57
(Russell & Russell 1973).
21. Id. Under the Arbitration Act, both parties in a labor dispute could agree to
submit the matter to a board of arbitrators. In addition, the Act granted to the President
the power to appoint a temporary commission to investigate the labor controversy. The
President could execute the power upon the request of the governor of a state, or by his or
her own initiative. Id. at 56.
22. Id.
23. Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. SOl, 502 (1888).
24. RLA AT FIfTY, supra note 13, at 5. The Pullman strike of 1894 arose out of the
worsening economic and work conditions faced by employees of the Pullman Palace Car
Company. S. LENS, THE LABOR WARS 87-88 (1973). In 1880, George M. Pullman, owner
of the sleeping and dining car manufacturer, constructed a town south of Chicago so his
workers could live in a single community near the plant. With the economic depression of
the early 1890's, George Pullman imposed a "double squeeze" on his employees. Id.
While reducing his work force substantially and cutting wages of remaining workers nearly
thirty percent, id. at 88, Pullman refused to reduce rents and utility charges. Id. Contem
plating a strike, a committee of employees appealed to the company for arbitration sessions.
P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 150 (1964). After the company's
refusal, the employees, acting through the American Railway Union, struck and called for
a boycott of roads using Pullman cars. The boycott found rapid support among railway
workers nationally and in five days resulted in the complete paralysis of the country's major
railways. Id. at 151. When the railroads sought to circumvent the boycott by hiring re
placement workers, violence erupted in Illinois. While President Cleveland invoked the
investigatory provisions of the Arbitration Act to assess the problem, his Attorney General,
Richard Olney, found adequate justification for more pervasive government intervention in
the constitutionally delineated federal interest in interstate commerce. Id. at ·152. Citing
interference with the mails, Olney succeeded in obtaining broad injunctions proscribing
obstruction of the railroads. When striking and boycotting employees refused to observe
the injunctions, Olney found justification to increase the scope of federal intervention even
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a successor statute, the Erdman Act of 1898.25 The new statute dis
carded the investigatory mechanism introduced by the 1888 Act.
While retaining the voluntary arbitration provisions, its most signifi
cant feature was adopting mediation as a device for resolving railway
labor disputes. 26 The Erdman Act provided that either party in the
dispute could request that the U.S. Commissioner of Labor and the
Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission intervene and
make every effort to resolve conflicts by mediation. 27
The Erdman Act also protected the individual employee, as well
as minority unions and groups of employees, from the employer and
the majority labor organization. With respect to selecting arbitrators,
the Act provided that when a controversy "involves and affects the
interests of two or more classes and grades of employees belonging to
different labor organizations, such arbitrator shall be agreed upon and
designated by the concurrent action of all such labor organizations. "28
The Act also prohibited railroad employers from imposing unjust re
quirements as conditions of employment. In particular, the statute
barred employment contracts which required an employee to agree not
to become a member of a labor organization. 29
In 1913, Congress amended the Erdman Act, which, as modified,
became known as the Newlands Act. 30 Congress incorporated
further. A reluctant President'Cleveland dispatched federal troops to Chicago to dissolve
the strike. [d. at 154. Only after an escalation of violence and several deaths did the strik
ers end their campaign. Id. Commentators agree that the strike failed since, in the end, the
employees gained no concessions. Id. at ISS. The report on the strike compiled pursuant
to the Arbitration Act was not completed until after the strike had ended. RLA AT FIfTY,
supra note 13, at 4-5.
25. Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
26. RLA AT FIfTY, supra note 13, at 5. Mediation and arbitration are two distinct
methods of resolving bargaining impasses. Both involve third party intervention but are
different "in terms of the degree of independence left to the parties to the bargaining im
passe. With arbitration, the parties enlist an outside third party to make a judicial-like
decision on the points in dispute." R. ALLEN, T. KEAVENY, CONTEMPORARY LABOR
RELATIONS 317 (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 1983). The parties agree to relinquish
their independence and to abide by the arbitrator's decision. In mediation, however, the
third party mediator enters the dispute and remains involved in the dispute at the discre
tion of the parties. The parties may drop the mediator at any time. The mediator is not
charged with reaching specific solutions or outcomes but rather with providing a fruitful
process through which the parties may reach an agreement. Id.
27. Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
28. Id. at 425.
29. Id. at 428. Employment contracts containing such clauses, commonly referred
to as "yellow-dog contracts," carried "discharge" as the penalty for union affiliation. Den
ver Local Union No. 13 v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 38, 101 P.2d 436, 443 (1940).
Similar proscriptions appear in RLA Section 152, Fifth. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fifth (1982).
For·text of § 152, Fifth, see infra note 70.
30. Newlands Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913).
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broader jurisdiction in the Newlands Act than in the Erdman Act.
The new Act's provisions were applicable not only to disputes over the
negotiation of agreements but also to disputes arising out of the inter
pretation of those agreements. 3! The Newlands Act established, for
the first time, a permanent mediation and conciliation board. 32
During World War I, the Railroad Administration assumed con
trol of the railroads and the Administration's Director General en
tered into national agreements with the unions.33 The Railroad
Administration emphasized the right of employees to gain member
ship in railroad labor organizations, resulting in increased union mem
bership among employees and giving the unions additional bargaining
power.
After World War I, Congress enacted the Transportation Act of
1920, returning the railroads to private ownership.34 The Transporta
tion Act provided that both parties in a dispute should make every
effort to reach a settlement between themselves, and that unresolved
disputes should be referred to the United States Railroad Labor
Board. 3s Congress assigned the Board the functions of "hearing and
decision," making it both a mediator and an arbitrator. 36 The Trans
portation Act scheme drew criticism from both sides. Labor believed
that the right of the Board to determine wages and working rules lim
ited collective bargaining. The railroads, as well as labor, disapproved
of the Board's dual mediation and arbitration roles. 37
The Transportation Act addressed employee representation rights
more specifically than did its predecessors. It required that all "dis
putes ... be considered and, if possible, decided in conference between
representatives designated and authorized so to confer by the carriers,
or the employees or subordinate officials thereof, directly interested in
31.. RLA AT FIFfY, supra note 13, "at 5. The Supreme Court later identified this
distinction between negotiation of agreements and interpretation of agreements in the con
text of the RLA, as the distinction between major and minor disputes respectively. The
two dispute classifications trigger different procedural and representation rights for unions
and individuals. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945), adhered to, 327
U.S. 661 (1946).
32. RLA AT FIFfY, supra note 13, at 5. Labor grew distrustful ofthe Erdman Act's
voluntary arbitration provisions. This attitude arose out of dissatisfaction with "awards
made by an arbitration board in 1914 pursuant to Presidential pressures to reach a resolu
tion in a labor dispute. As a result, mediation became the more popular alternative. J.
KAUFMAN, supra note 20, at 62.
33. RLA AT FIFfY, supra note 13, at 6.
34. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91,41 Stat. 456 (1920).
35. J. KAUFMAN, supra note 20, at 64.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 65.
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the dispute."38 In addition, the Act recognized the right of an "organ
ization of employees ... whose members are directly interested in the
dispute," or a group of 100 unorganized workers signing a petition, to
bring a dispute before an Adjustment Board or the Labor Board for
settlement. 39 Similar provisions appeared in the 1926 Railway Labor
Act. 40
General dissatisfaction with the Transportation Act's reliance on
compulsory arbitration as the primary method of dispute resolution
grew quickly. In 1924, the Republican party platform advocated
amending the Transportation Act.41 At the urging of President Coo
lidge, a committee of railway executives and union representatives
drafted a bill which they jointly presented to Congress in January,
1926.42 This bill became the Railway Labor Act.
The Railway Labor Act primarily emphasized collective bargain
ing for the settlement of labor-management disputes and provided for
mandatory mediation only if bargaining failed. The Act invoked arbi
tration only when both parties agreed. 43
In spite of both labor's and the railways' participation in creating
the RLA, conft.icts soon arose in interpreting its provisions. 44 As late
as 1934, railways challenged the employees' statutory guarantees of
free choice of representation. Railways refused to acknowledge and
deal with any unions except local company-dominated unions. 4s In
1934, Congress amended the RLA to bar not only yellow-dog con
38. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920). Similar language
appears in RLA Section 152, Second. 45 U.S.c. § 152, Second (1982). See infra note 65.
39. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920).
40. 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(i) and G) (1982). See infra notes 63-64.
41. The Republican Party platform stated that "[c]ollective bargaining, mediation,
and voluntary arbitration are the most important steps in the maintaining of peaceful labor
relations and should be encouraged. We do not believe in compulsory action." RLA AT
FIFTY, supra note 13, at 7.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982». The five basic purposes of the Act appeared in section 2:
1. To prevent the interruption of service.
2. To ensure the right of employees to organize.
3. To provide complete independence of organization by both parties.
4. To assist in prompt settlement of disputes over rates of pay, work rules, or
working conditions.
5. To assist in prompt settlement of disputes or grievances over interpretation or
application of existing contracts.
RLA AT FIFTY, supra note 13, at 9 (citing Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347,44 Stat. 577
(1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982»).
44. RLA AT FIFTY, supra note 13, at 9.
45. Id. at 13.
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tracts, which were individual employment contracts prohibiting union
affiliations, but also company-dominated unions. 46 In addition, the
amended version continued the ban established in the 1926 Act on the
closed shop, an arrangement by which an employee was required to
join a particular union. 47
Railway labor legislation leading to the 1926 Railway Labor Act
and its amendments consisted of a series of attempts to balance four
competing interests: (1) the national interest in preserving the contin
ued flow of commerce via the railroads, (2) the interest of the railways
in carrying out their businesses without excessive government interfer
ence, (3) the interest of the majority of railroad employees in preserv
ing collective bargaining power to protect their wages and achieve
acceptable working conditions, and (4) the interests of individual em
ployees in deciding against union membership or for membership in
the union which best protects individual contractual and statutory
rights. Congress repealed railway labor statutes enacted prior to the
RLA because they failed to strike the proper balance among these in
terests. The RLA, in contrast to its predecessors, has survived for
over sixty years. While the statute's longevity may attest to its relative
success in striking the proper balance among these four competing in
terests, some problems remain. One issue not expressly addressed by
the RLA is whether an individual employee may assert a right to mi
nority union representation at a company-level grievance or investiga
tory proceeding.

B. Railway Labor Act Provisions Defining the Right of
Representation
The general purpose of the RLA is to avert industrial strife on the
railroads. 48 Congress intended the RLA to settle labor disputes by
inducing negotiations between only the true representatives of the rail
road and employees involved. 49 To this end, RLA Section 151a in
cludes, among the statute's express purposes: (1) to bar any
infringement of the employees' freedom of association or their right to
join a labor union; and (2) to permit self-organization of railroads and
46. Id. at 14.
47. Id. The closed shop ban was substantially reversed in 1951 when Congress again
amended the RLA, this time adopting a form of required union membership as a means of
preserving the unions' bargaining strength. Id. at 15.
48. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 659 (1965).
49. Brotherhood of.R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377,
reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969).
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employees in order that specific provisions of the statute can be carried
out. so This section acknowledges that representation in the context of
labor relations has two dimensions. First, an individual employee's
representation by a union should be a function of that employee's per
sonal choice. In contrast, the reference in Section ISla to the "self
organization" of employees underscores the concern that, for employ
ees to exercise viable bargaining power in dealings with railroad man
agement, they must often speak in one "organized" collective voice.
The RLA's express purposes, therefore, recognize that in applying the
RLA's provisions a court should strike a practicable balance between
these two potentially conflicting dimensions of "representation."
The scopes of the respective representation rights of the individ
ual employee and of the collective unit of employees cannot be con
stant throughout the spectrum of disputes which arise between a
railroad employer and an employee or group of employees. While
some disputes concern matters affecting all employees, others concern
individual employment contracts and negligibly affect the collective
unit. The Railway Labor Act recognizes this distinction by dividing
all disputes into two separate categories, "major disputes" and "minor
disputes."51 The first type of dispute, or "major dispute," is that
50. RLA section 151a provides:
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or
to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon
freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employ
ment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to
provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter
of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for
the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982).
51. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S.
661 (1946). The RLA itself does not use the terms "major dispute" and "minor dispute."
Burley, however, suggested that such a classification could be implied from the statute:
The difference between disputes over grievances and disputes concerning the
making of collective agreements is traditional in railway labor affairs. It has as
sumed large importance in the Railway Labor Act of 1934, substantively and
procedurally. It divides the jurisdiction and functions of the Adjustment Board
from those of the Mediation Board, giving them their distinct characters. It also
affects the parts to be played by the collective agent and the represented employ
ees, first in negotiations for settlement in conference and later in the quite differ
ent procedures which the Act creates for disposing of the two types of
disputes. . . . In general the difference is between what are regarded traditionally
as the major and the minor disputes of the railway labor world.
Id. at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between
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which arises over the formation or modification of collective agree
ments. It involves the "acquisition of rights for the future. "52 These
disputes raise the larger issues over which strikes may arise. 53 Minor
disputes, on the other hand, which involve grievances and the inter
pretation of established agreements, are less likely to interrupt com
merce or affect relations between employees as a class and railways. 54
The RLA, in recognition of the difference between major and mi
nor disputes, fashions different procedures, including a unique balanc
ing of collective and individual representation interests, for the two
types of disputes. The Act requires negotiation between the parties as
the first stage for either major or minor disputes. The post-negotiation
procedures, however, differ. 55 Major disputes are presented for media
tion to the National Mediation Board. 56 If mediation fails, the parties
either accept or reject arbitration. 57 Minor disputes, on the other
hand, proceed from negotiations to the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, which is empowered "to conduct hearings and make
findings. "58
While the RLA spells out the two procedural settlement mecha
nisms, the collective and individual representation rights are identified
only with respect to major disputes. 59 Section 152, Fourth gives the
power to choose a "collective bargaining" representative to the "ma
jority of any craft or class of employees."60 The statute places exclu
major and minor disputes as well as the implications of the classification, see infra notes
243-68 and accompanying text.
52. Id. at 723.
53. Id. at 723-24.
54. Id. at 724. The President's National Labor Management Conference of 1945
perceived the machinery for handling grievances [minor disputes] as limited in applicability
to disputes "involving the interpretation or application of the agreement in which the arbi
ter 'should have no power to add to, subtract from, change, or modify any provision of the
agreement, but should be authorized only to interpret the existing provisions of the agree
ment and apply them to the specific facts of the grievance or dispute.' " Dunau, Employee
Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 733
(1950) (quoting 3 President's Nat'l Labor-Management Conf. 143 (1945».
55. Dunau, supra note 54, at 733.
56. 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1982).
57. Id.
58. 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (k) (1982).
59. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982).
60. Id. RLA section 152, Fourth provides:
Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through rep
resentatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employ
ees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or
class for the purposes of this chapter. No carrier, its officers, or agents shall deny
or in any way question the right of its employees to join, organize, or assist in
organizing the labor organization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for any
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sive authority "to negotiate and to conclude agreements concerning
major disputes in the duly selected collective agent."61 This exclusive
authority encompasses representation not only at the negotiation level,
but at the mediation and arbitration stages as well. 62 The representa
tive chosen by the majority of employees acts at every stage of dispute
resolution where major disputes arise. Where, in the context of collec
tive bargaining, the representational interests of the collective majority
and the individual or minority conflict, the majority interest prevails.
The statute is unclear with respect to who may act as representa
tive for an employee or group of employees in a minor dispute. Sec
tion 153, FirstG) grants, to the individual or group of employees
appearing before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB),
the right to "be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other repre
sentatives, as they may respectively elect."63 However, section 153,
First(i), in setting out the grievance resolution procedures through the
"chief operating officer of the carrier," states only that grievances
"shall be handled in the usual manner."64 Whether the exclusive bar
gaining authority of the majority's collective agent extends to com
carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees ... Provided,
That nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit a carrier from permit
ting an employee, individually, or local representatives of employees from confer
ring with management during .working hours without loss of time, or to prohibit a
carrier from furnishing free transportation to its employees while engaged in the
business of a labor organization.
45 U.S.c. § 152, Fourth (1982).
61. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 728 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661
(1946) (citing Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937».
62. Id. at 729.
63. RLA section 153, First(j) provides:
Parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as
they may respectively elect, and the several divisions of the Adjustment Board
shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier
or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.
45 U.S.C. § 153, First(j) (1982). In Burley, the Supreme Court determined that the right of
exclusive authority of the majority union did not extend to grievance resolution proceed
ings before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Burley, 325 U.S. at 733-36 (1945).
64. RLA section 153, First(i) provides:
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agree
ments concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pend
ing and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to
and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such
disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be
referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of
the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data
bearing upon the disputes.
45 U.S.C. § 153, First(i) (1982).
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pany-Ievel grievance proceedings is not clear from' the terms of the
statute. While the statute does not expressly grant such authority, it
does not exclude it either.
Section 153, First(i)'s ambiguity invites consideration of any
other possibly applicable RLA provisions. While several provisions
refer to representation rights, none specify the type of disputes to
which they apply, nor is it clear whether they are applicable to dispute
resolution at all. Their common theme appears to be protecting em
ployees from employer manipulation. They do not, however, define
the appropriate balance between individual and collective representa
tion rights in major and minor disputes. .
RLA section 152, Second, for example, makes "representatives
designated ... by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof
interested in the dispute" responsible for executing the RLA's dispute
resolution mechanisms. 6s The provision requires that the representa
tives "consider[ ], and, if possible, decide[ ]" all disputes in confer
ence. 66 One court has referred to section 152, Second as "a general
statement of the responsibilities of carriers and employees for resolving
disputes,"67 suggesting that section 152, Second does not reach the
specific questions of how employees designate representatives and
what different representation rights they wield in the separate contexts
of minor and major disputes. While the general responsibility be
stowed on representatives in this section alludes to the significant con
sequence of employees' choice of representation, the language of
section 152, Second does not identify the different contours of the rep
resentation right in major disputes and' minor disputes.
Section 152, Third also refers to representation in railway labor
disputes. It provides ~hat representatives shall be selected "without
interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation
of representatives by the other."68 This section also states that repre
65. RLA section 152, Second provides:
All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees shall be con
sidered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between repre
sentatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or
carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1982).
66. Id.
67. Landers v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 84-467-K, slip op. at 9 (D. Mass.
Jun. 24, 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1440 (i988). For a
discussion of the facts and decisions of the court of appeals and the district court in Land
ers, see infra notes 102-33 and accompanying text.
68. RLA section 152, Third provides:
Representatives, for the purposes of this chapter, shall be designated by the re
spective parties without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over
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sentatives need not be persons who are employed by the carrier.69 As
in section 152, Second, the language ofthis provision does not contem
plate any particular dispute resolution procedure. While it guarantees
employees, collectively and individually, the freedom to select a major
ity union without interference by the employer, it leaves unresolved
the question of whether the majority union can preempt an individual
employee from selecting minority union representation for disputes of
an individual nature.
Section 152, Fifth also appears to protect the freedom of individ
ual employees to choose a representative. It prohibits railways from
requiring, as a condition of employment, that employees agree to
either join a union or to refrain from joining a union. 70 Congress in
corporated this subsection into the RLA as part of the 1934 amend
ments in order to eliminate company unions. In a 1951 amendment,
however, Congress added section 152, Eleventh,71 which retracts some
of the effects of section 152, Fifth. Section 152, Eleventh(a) permits a
carrier and a "duly designated and authorized" labor organization to
enter into an agreement by which employees can be required, as a con
dition of employment, to become members of the labor organization
representing their craft or class.72 Subsection Eleventh(c) mollifies the
the designation of representatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way
interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives. Rep
resentatives of employees for the purposes of this chapter need not be persons in
the employ of the carrier, and no carrier shall, by interference, influence, or coer
cion seek in any manner to prevent the designation by its employees as their rep
resentatives of those who or which are not employees of the carrier.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1982).
69. [d.
70. RLA section 152, Fifth provides:
No carrier, its officers, or agents shall require any person seeking employment to
sign any contract or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organiza
tion; and if any such contract has been enforced prior to the effective date of this
chapter, then such carrier shall notify the employees by an appropriate order that
such contract has been discarded and is no longer binding on them in any way.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Fifth (1982).
71. Railway Labor Act amendment, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951).
72. RLA section 152, Eleventh provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations
duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter shall be permitted
(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that
within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective
date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become mem
bers of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no
such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to em
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provisions of Eleventh(a) by allowing the union membership require
ment to be satisfied by membership in any "labor organization, na
tional in scope, organized in accordance with" the Act. 73 Subsection
Eleventh(c) does not, however, expressly address whether a union
other than a majority union can act as a representative in a minor
dispute.
A review of the RLA's major amendments reveals a persistent
congressional concern for preserving the bargaining power of majority
unions in collective bargaining and in the handling of major disputes.
The amendments have not, however, added clarity to the contours of
representation rights in minor disputes. The 1934 amendment of sec
tion 152, Fifth targeted the RLA's failure, in its original form, to elim
inate company-dominated unions. The amendment successfully
handled the company union problem but its practical effect was to
disallow agreements between carriers and legitimate labor organiza
tions to provide for the union shop and for the deduction of associated
membership fees. 74 In response, labor unions asserted that they could
not effectively carry out their responsibilities as "representatives."7s
They argued that RLA Section 152, Fourth76 and the 1944 Supreme
Court decision in Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.77 imposed a duty on
the union selected by the majority of employees to act fairly as a col
ployees to whom membership ... was denied or terminated for any reason other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and
assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982).
73. RLA section 152, Eleventh(c) provides in part:
(c) The requirement of membership in a labor organization in an agreement
made pursuant to subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be satisfied, as to both
a present or future employee in engine, train, yard, or hostling service, that is, an
employee engaged in any of the services or capacities covered in the First division
of paragraph (h) of section 153 of this title defining the jurisdictional scope of the
First Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, if said employee shall
hold or acquire membership in anyone of the labor organizations, national in
scope, organized in accordance with this chapter and admitting to membership
employees of a craft or class in any of said services . . . .
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(c) (1982).
74. H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
75. Id. at 3-4.
76. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982). See supra note 60 for text of statute. Section
152, Fourth states that "[tJhe majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the
right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class." Id. This statutory
scheme contemplates collective action by a group of employees through the representative
chosen by the majority. H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
77. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

1989]

EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION

43

lective agent for all employees in a craft or class. 78 That duty, the
unions claimed, could not be carried out under the proscriptions of
section 152, Fifth. The labor unions argued that the law permitted
non-union members to share in the benefits of collective agreements
negotiated by the majority's union pursuant to its legal duty while not
requiring them to share in the cost of securing those benefits. 79
Congress responded to the unions' concerns in 1951 by adding
section 152, Eleventh, authorizing carrier-union agreements creating
union shops. Section 152, Eleventh incorporated the idea that an indi
vidual's freedom of association could be subjugated to the majority's
interest in exclusive representation. Section 152, Eleventh(c) retains
some latitude for individual employees by providing an option other
than membership in the union that represents the majority of employ
ees. The provision permits employees to select membership in anyone
of the nationally organized railway labor unions representing their
craft or class. 80 This freedom to choose, however, is not, according to
the settled interpretation of section 152, Fourth, the right to be repre
sented by that union in major disputes. Until the Supreme Court ac
ted recently in Landers, courts differed over whether the individual
employee's right to choose a union encompasses the right to be repre
sented by that union at the company level in minor disputes. The con
flict stemmed largely from the equivocation of section 153, First(i),81
the only RLA provision expressly establishing company-level proce
dural requirements in minor disputes.
Before Landers, the statutory ambiguity in the definition of the
representation right in minor disputes at the company level resulted in
several cases seeking judicial interpretion of the contours of the right.
Faced with an absence of controlling language in section 153, First(i),
the courts relied on two other sets of statutory provisions even though
they provide only general characterizations of the right to representa
tion. First, the courts attempted to define the representation right by
implication from the statute's purposes. 82 In addition, they referred to
78. Id. at 204. Steele declared that the majority-chosen representative must repre
sent all members of the craft or class fairly, equitably, and in good faith even if they are not
members of the union. Id.
.79. H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950). Out of 1,200,000 employees
in the railroad industry in 1950, 75 to 80 percent were members of a railway labor union.
Id.
80. 45 U.S.c. § 152, Eleventh(c) (1982). For text of § 152, Eleventh(c), see supra
note 73.
81. 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(i) (1982). For text of § 153, First(i), see supra note 64.
82. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982). For text of § 151a, see supra note 50.
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those provisions which identify the right to representation generally,83
even though they do not distinguish between major and minor dis
putes. As a result of the statute's ambiguity, the courts reached one of
two contrary but statutorily justifiable interpretations. One group of
decisions found that the Railway Labor Act permits representation at
a company-level grievance or investigatory hearing only by the party
designated in the collective bargaining agreement, usually the exclu
sive bargaining agent chosen by the majority of the employees. 84 The
other group of cases found that the statute grants to an individual the
right to choose a representative even if it is a minority union. 85
II.

MINORITY UNION REPRESENTATION AT THE COMPANY
LEVEL: CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS

A.

Latest Restatements by the Courts of Appeals of the Two
Conflicting Interpretations: Taylor v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad86 and Landers v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp. 87

Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, decided in 1986 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Landers v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp., decided in 1987 by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, represented the latest restatements of
the conflicting interpretations of the RLA on the question of minority
union representation prior to the Supreme Court's decision on the
matter on a grant of certiorari in Landers. The Court granted certio
rari in Landers "to resolve the conflict between [the] two courts of
appeals over this question of federal railway labor law."88 The follow
83. 45 U.S.c. § 152 (1982).
84. Landers v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 814 F.2d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd,
108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988); Edwards v. St. Louis - San Francisco R.R., 361 F.2d 946, 953-54
(7th Cir. 1966); Butler v. Thompson, 192 F.2d 831,833 (8th Cir. 1951); Broady v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73, 76 (7th Cir. 1951); D'Amico v. Pennsylvania R.R., 191 F. Supp.
160,162 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Switchmen's Union ofN. Am. v. Louisville and N. R.R., 130 F.
Supp. 220, 227 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
85. Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 794 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 670 (1986); McElroy v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 392 F.2d 966, 969-70 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. McElroy, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969); General
Comm. of Adjustment of Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs for Pac. Lines of S. Pac. Co. v. South
ern Pac. Co., 132 F.2d 194, 202 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 320 U.S.
338 (1943); Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1937), reh'g denied, 89
F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937); Coar v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 618 F. Supp. 380, 384
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. 794 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986).
87. 814 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988).
88. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442.
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ing section discusses the rationales relied upon in Taylor and Landers
by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and First Circuits respectively
and concludes by examining the Supreme Court's weighing of the two
approaches in Landers.
1.

Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Railroad

The most recent case finding a right to minority union representa
tion at company-level grievance hearings is Taylor v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad. In Taylor, the four individual plaintiffs were employees of
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MOP AC) and were members of
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), which served as the
collective bargaining agent for members of the engineers' craft work
ing for MOPAC. The employees worked as switchmen, a craft repre
sented in collective bargaining with MOPAC by the United
Transportation Union (UTU). When the employees became involved
in company-level disciplinary proceedings, they sought BLE represen
tation. MOPAC denied the request, relying on the agreement between
MOPAC and the UTU which specified that only the UTU could rep
resent switchmen at MOPAC disciplinary hearings. The plaintiffs'
complaints sought declaratory relief and an injunction against enforce
ment of the UTU-MOPAC collective bargaining agreement. The dis
trict court granted the relief and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. 89
After dismissing jurisdictional arguments posed by MOPAC as
invalid,90 the Taylor court turned to the substantive issue of the RLA's
representation guarantees. 91 Paralleling the rationale of the United
States Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Coar v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. ,92 the Fifth Circuit
89. Taylor, 794 F.2d at 1083-84.
90. Id. at 1084-85. The court of appeals first disposed of MOPAC's threshold argu
ment that the issue at hand was really one of jurisdiction. Id. at 1084. MOPAC contended
that the National Mediation Board, because the dispute was over which union was the
rightful representative, was the proper forum. Id. In the alternative, MOPAC argued that
the National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB) had jurisdiction over any disputes per
taining to interpretation of a collective agreement. Id. The court rejected both arguments
on the grounds that the central issue was the validity of a contractual provision measured
under the RLA, an issue within federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 1085.
91. Id. at 1085.
92. - 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Coar involved five individual plaintiffs em
ployed by Metro-North as engineers who were members of the United Transportation
Union (UTU). While the UTU was the collective bargaining agent for firemen and brake
men, the BLE was the agent for locomotive engineers. The collective bargaining agreement
between the BLE and Metro-North permitted engineers to be represented only by an
elected or appointed officer of the BLE during disciplinary investigations. Each of the
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Court of Appeals in Taylor emphasized the absence of a single disposi
plaintiffs sought, and were denied, UTU representation at company-level disciplinary pro
ceedings. While the meaning of the terms of the BLE agreement with Metro-North regard
ing representation was not an issue, the plaintiffs claimed that those terms violated RLA
sections 152 and 153. Id. at 381. The BLE argued that the controversy was a contract
interpretation dispute strictly within the jurisdiction of the NRAB and not properly heard
by the courts. Id. at 382. The district court granted the employees' motion for summary
judgment.
The Coar court refused to accept the BLE's characterization of the dispute. Instead,
the court identified the issue as whether the BLElMetro-North agreement was valid under
the RLA to the extent that it limited employees' representational rights. Id. This issue, the
Coar court concluded, fell within the court's jurisdiction. Id.
In analyzing the RLA, the Coar court admitted that "no one provision of the RLA
clearly addresses this issue." Id. It explained that its decision, by necessity, must rely on
"examination of the purposes of the Act and the aggregate rights it provides." Id.
The Coar court observed that while union membership could be required as a condi
tion of employment under section 152, Eleventh(a), that requirement could be satisfied by
membership in either the BLE or a minority union. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(c)
(1982». "The right of an employee," the court said, "to belong to any union implicitly
carries with it the right to enjoy the privileges of membership, including representation by
that union." Id. (citing Taylor v. Missouri Pac. RR., 614 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (E.D. La.
1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.), cerr. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986». Citing McElroy
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 392 F.2d 966, 969 (7th. Cir. 1968), cerr. denied, Termi
nal R.R Ass'n of St. Louis v. McElroy, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969), the Coar court interpreted
RLA section 152, Second as granting the right to employees to choose any representative,
"including the minority union," to act for them in a dispute. Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 383
(citing McElroy, 382 F.2d at 969). The BLE, the majority union, seeking a more restrictive
interpretation of the minority union representation right, attempted to distinguish McElroy
by noting that, in McElroy, the employees were frequently transferred between crafts,
whereas Metro-North did not permit such practices. The Coar court, however, dismissed
the argument, commenting that regardless of whether shuttling was practiced, employees
retained the right to remain members of the minority union while working as engineers.
The Coar court noted that RLA section 152, Second contemplates the exercise of rep
resentation rights by individual employees. Citing General Committee of Adjustment of
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for Pac. Lines of S. Pac. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co.,
132 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1942), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, the Coar court explained that
"representatives designated by employees" within the context of the RLA section 152, Sec
ond, may reasonably be interpreted to encompass a "representative designated by a single
employee." Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 383 (citing General Comm., 132 F.2d at 199 (for a dis
cussion of General Comm., see infra note 164». This interpretation, it reasoned, was con
sistent with the Supreme Court's observation in Burley that an agreement between a
railway and a union cannot abridge an individual's representation rights. Id. (citing Elgin,
J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 740 n.39 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661 (1946».
The Coar court also referred, as the McElroy court did, to the 1934 congressional
hearings on the RLA during which Commissioner Eastman explained that while a com
pany should not have to deal with more than one party in collective bargaining matters, an
employee should not be barred from taking up an individual grievance directly with man
agement. Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 384 (citing H.R REP. No. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 44
(1934) (for an excerpt from Commissioner Eastman's testimony, see infra note 156». The
court reasoned that if, as Commissioner Eastman had suggested, "an individual may pres
ent his own grievances, it follows that he may designate the representative of his choice to
do likewise." Id.
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tive RLA provision. The Taylor court reasoned that it must rely on
indications of congressional intent. 93 It identified the "purposes" laid
out in RLA section 151a emphasizing the prohibition on "any limita
tion upon freedom of association among employees" as evidence of
congressional intent. 94
In seeking additional indications of congressional intent, the Tay
lor court cited section 152, Eleventh(a) and (c), which provide that
while a collective bargaining agreement may require an employee to
belong to a national labor organization, it cannot require membership
in any particular union. 9s "These provisions persuade us," the court
said, "that Congress attached significant importance to an employee's
freedom to choose his or her representative and to belong to the union
preferred by the employee."96 The Taylor court recognized, as had the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in McElroy v.
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis,97 that a minority union
93.

Taylor, 794 F.2d at 1085.
94. Id. (citing 45 U.S.c. § 151a (1982) (for text of § 151a, see supra note 50».
95. ·Id.
96. Id.
97. 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). In McElroy, the
plaintiff minority union employees had been shuttled between the engineers' and firemen's
crafts according to the employer Terminal's needs. The plaintiffs, working as engineers at
the time they filed their time claim grievances, sought representation by the Firemen's
Union. Id. at 967.
In addressing the representation issue, the McElroy court first acknowledged the ex
clusive representation authority of the collective bargaining agent in major disputes. Id. at
968 (citing Virginian Ry. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937». The court then
focused on RLA section 152, Second which provides that all disputes shall be considered
"in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respec
tively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute." Id.
at 968-69 (citing 45 U.S.c. § 152, Second (1982». In interpreting this provision, the court
referred to the RLA's legislative history. In particular, it recalled the 1934 congressional
testimony of Commissioner Eastman and railroad spokesman George Harrison in which
they presented their view that, in grievance matters, railroad employees have the right to
minority union representation. Id. at 969 (citing H.R. REP. No. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
44, 89 (1934». The McElroy court reasoned that the testimony supported the notion that
in a grievance matter involving a minority union member, the minority union member is
the "employee interested in the dispute" within the meaning of section 152, Second and,
therefore, is entitled to minority union representation. Id.
The court proposed that such an interpretation of section 152, Second was consistent
with other RLA representation provisions. Id. It noted that section 152, Third, which
guarantees employees and carriers the right to choose representatives without interference,
and section 152, Fourth, which permits employees to confer with management during
working hours themselves or through their local representative, both support the finding of
an employee's right to minority union representation at company-level grievance proceed
ings. Id. Like the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Estes V. Union Terminal Co.,
the McElroy court reasoned that section 153, First(j), which grants employees the right to
choose any representative to act before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB),
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could not negotiate another collective bargaining agreement. 98 It
noted, however, that "given the apparent importance Congress at
tached to freedom of choice, that right [to minority ~nion representa
tion] should be limited only when compelled by express language of
the RLA."99
The Tay/or court found additional support for its interpretation
in section 152, Second. Tay/or construed the language as an individu
alized guarantee to the parties involved rather than as a generic one
evidences similar congressional intent to create the same representation rights in proceed
ings before the carrier. Id.; see also Estes v. Union Terminal Co., '89 F.2d 768, 770 (5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 89 F.2d 768 (1937), infra note 178.
The McElroy court also cited section 153, First(i) in support of its decision. The court
observed that since section 153, First(i) requires that minor disputes "be handled in the
usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier," and since the
standard procedure under McElroy's facts had been to allow minority union representation
at grievance hearings, that practice should not be discontinued. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 969.
McElroy also cited prior judicial decisions to support its interpretation. It first re
ferred to Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. v. Burley. Id. at 969-70 (citing Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661 (1946». In Burley, the Supreme
Court determined that "the individual employee's rights cannot be nullified merely by
agreement between the carrier and the union." Burley, 325 U.S. at 740 n.39. The McElroy
court used that rationale to support its contention that the majority union's collective
agreement could not bar minority union members from choosing their representative at
company-level hearings. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 969. McElroy cited Douds v. Local 1250,
173 F.2d 764, 772 (2d Cir. 1949), as an illustration of the statutory construction of the
National Labor Relations Act to grant similar rights. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 970. It found
support in General Committee of Adjustment of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for
Pac. Lines of S. Pac. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 132 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1942), rev'd on
jurisdictional grounds, 320 U.S. 338 (1943), as well. Id. at 970 (citing General Comm., 132
F.2d at 198 (for a discussion of General Comm., see infra note 164». The McElroy court
focused on the General Comm. language suggesting that the "confidence and trust neces
sary between a suitor and his representative" are absent when an employee is represented
by the majority union of which he or she is not a member. Id.
In McElroy, the majority union, the BLE, argued that Broady v. Illinois Central R.R.,
191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951) (for a discussion of Broady, see
infra note 114), a decision denying minority union representation,bound the court to reject
the employees' claim for minority union representation. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 971. How
ever, the McElroy court distinguished Broady by noting that Broady involved a "rival
union" which had no collective bargaining contract with the railroad. Id. A "rival union,"
by definition, was not among the "labor organizations, national in scope, organized in ac
cordance with this chapter" in which section 152, Eleventh allows railways and unions, via
agreements, to compel membership of employees. Id. (quoting § 152, Eleventh (1982». In
McElroy, the minority union was a nationally recognized labor union which, in fact, was a
party to a collective bargaining agreement with Terminal on behalf of firemen. The McEl
roy court's implicit assertion was that while the RLA generally tolerates minority union
representation by nationally recognized labor unions, it does not allow representation by
"rival unions" at company-level grievance hearings.
98. Taylor, 794 F.2d at 1085.
99. Id.
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simply referring to the collective bargaining agent's duties. loo The
court characterized its decision recognizing a right to minority union
representation at company-level grievance proceedings as consistent
with the RLA policy of employee freedom of choice, the "desire for
labor-management stability," and "company-level settlement of
disputes." \01
2.

Landers v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. \02

In Landers, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted
the RLA' to deny minority union representation in a decision reviving
the view espoused in Switchmen's Union ofNorth America v. Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co. \03 over thirty years earlier. During that
100. Id. at 1086 (citing 45 U.S.c. § 152, Second (1982) (for text of § 152, Second, see
supra note 65».
101. Taylor, 794 F.2d at 1086.
102. 814 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988).
103. 130 F. Supp. 220 (W.O. Ky. 1955). Switchmen's Union followed in the foot
steps of Broady v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 342 U.S. 897
(1951) (for a discussion of Broady, see infra note 114), and Butler v. Thompson, 192 F.2d
831 (8th Cir. 1951) (for a discussion of Butler, see infra note 114). In Switchmen's Union,
the United States District Court for ,the Western Dis~rict of Kentucky determined that the
phrase "in the usual manner," as used in RLA section 153, First(i), contemplates applying
the rules set forth in contractual agreements between majority union and employer.
Switchmen's Union, 130 F. Supp. at 227.
The aggrieved employee in Switchmen's Union argued that Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Bur
ley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661 (1946), supported his position. He
contended that Burley recognized the minority union's representation authority in griev
ance matters. Switchmen's Union, 130 F. Supp. at 225. The Switchmen's Union court re
jected the employee's reliance on Burley. The court concluded that Burley "does not reach
the situation in the case at bar where the employee neither sought nor was denied the right
personally to present his grievance to the highest operating officer of the Carrier." Id. The
court also dismissed as unpersuasive an Attorney General opinion, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 494
(1946), which expressly found Burley indicative of an RLA right to free choice of represen
tation at company-level proceedings. Switchmen's Union, 130 F. Supp. at 226. The court
noted that federal court cases since the attorney general's opinion "seemed to find compel
ling language in the Railway Labor Act to the contrary." Id.
The Switchmen's Union court found support in other judicial decisions for denying
minority union representation at company-level proceedings. The court cited United R.R.
Workers of Am., Independentv. Atchison, T. & S. F. R Co., D.C., 89 F. Supp. 666 (D. Ill.
1950), which held that the "usual manner" of handling grievances, to which RLA section
153, First(i)'refers, is the procedure laid out in the governing collective bargaining agree
ment. Switchmen's Union, 130 F. Supp. at 226 (citing United R.R. Workers, 89 F. Supp. at
672). The United R.R. Workers court found that when employees ignore such a procedure
in attempting to progress to the NRAB with a claim, they fail to satisfy a "mandatory
condition precedent to submission to the Board." United R,R. Workers, 89 F. Supp. at
672. The Switchmen's Union court cited Broady v. Illinois Cent. RR., 191 F.2d 73, 76 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951», as authority suppor:ting this principle as well.
Switchmen's Union, 130 F. Supp. at 226. The 'Switchmen's Union court concluded by ob
serving that the provisions of section 153, First(i) and G) are juxtaposed purposefully:
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thirty year period, however, federal courts had decided several cases
finding a right to minority union representation at the coIIlpany level.
In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in McElroy
that the RLA guarantees a right to minority union representation in
grievance matters. 104 Coar, \05 a 1985 decision by the District Court
for the Southern District of New York, and Taylor,l06 a.1986 decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, were both decided con
sistently with McElroy.
In February 1984, Amtrak charged Paul Landers, an engineer,
with work-related misconduct. Landers was a member of the UTU
while the bargaining representative for Amtrak's passenger engineers
was the BLE. Amtrak denied Landers the UTU representation which
he sought before the company-level investigatory hearing. The collec
tive bargaining agreement between Amtrak and the BLE provided
The specific authorization for representation at hearings before the Adjustment
Board and the use of the term "in the usual manner" with respect to hearings
before the Railroad officers authorizes the construction that the inclusion of un
limited representation only before the Adjustment Board includes representation
only as provided in the bargaining agreement.
Id. at 227.
104. 392 F.2d 966, 970 (1968), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986). For a discussion
of the McElroy decision, see supra note 97. Between 1955, when the District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky decided Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. Louisville and
Nashville R.R., 130 F. Supp. 220 (W.D. Ky. 1955), and 1987, when the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit decided Landers, the right of minority union representation before
company-level grievance proceedings was not specifically renounced by any federal court.
Two courts, however, dealt with related issues involving the procedural rights of individual
employees in grievance proceedings before their employers. Both courts issued decisions
adverse to the claims of the individual employees.
In D'Amico v. Pennsylvania R.R., 191 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), using RLA
interpretations similar to those employed in Broady, Butler, and Switchmen's Union, the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York denied an employee's claim
to a right to legal counsel in a company disciplinary hearing. The D'Amico court rested its
decision on the need to avoid making company-level proceedings rigid and awkward as well
as on the RLA right, guaranteed in section 153, First(j), to any representation, including
legal counsel, before the NRAB as a remedy for any employee dissatisfied with the resolu
tion of grievance matters at the company level. Id. at 163.
In Edwards v. St. Louis - San Francisco R.R., 361 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1966), an em
ployee sought a judgment declaring the impropriety of a company disciplinary fact-finding
hearing during which accusing witnesses had not been brought before the employee. The
employee had been discharged as a result of the hearing. The court ruled that the RLA
does not dictate procedures to be followed by a carrier for either the "conduct of an investi
gation hearing" or in the discharging of employees. Id. at 953. Where a dispute is between
private parties, concluded the court, their conduct is governed by contract. Id. at 954.
105. Coar v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 618 F. Supp. 380,384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
For a discussion of Coar, see supra note 92.
106. Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 794 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 670 (1986). For a discussion of Taylor, see supra notes 89-101 and accompanying
text.
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that only the bargaining agent could represent an engineer at such a
proceeding. Landers repr~sented himself, and received and served a
. suspension. 107 "
Rather than appeal the suspension to the NRAB, where he had a
statutory right to UTU representation in accordance with section 153,
FirstG), Landers filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory
relief against Amtrak and the BLE. Landers claimed that the collec
tive bargaining agreement clause violated his RLA right to a represen
tative of his choice. The district court found the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, which prohibited representation at
company-level investigatory hearings by parties other than the bar
gaining agent, binding. 108 Landers agreed with the district court's in
terpretation of the collective agreement, but argued that, regardless of
the terms of the agreement, the RLA granted him an absolute right to
representation by his chosen representative at a company-level hear
ing. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed and affirmed
the district court's decision. I09 The Landers court considered the em
ployee's argument that the RLA should be read in view of legislative
history. The RLA's legislative history, according to Landers, suggests
that employees traditionally enjoyed minority union representation.
The court noted, however, that the legislative history consists largely
of the testimony of two witnesses who lobbied before Congress for
amendments which never passed. 110 The Landers court declared that
the absence of these proposed changes in the current statutory lan
guage indicates an outright congressional rejection of the practice of
minority union representation before grievance hearings. I I I
T~e employee Landers also relied on section 153, FirstG) as sup
port for his right to choose a representative. I 12 The court pointed out,
. however, that while section 153, FirstG) expressly provides that
"[p]arties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other repre
sentatives," the language applies only to proceedings before the
NRAB and not to company-level hearings. I 13 Citing Butler v. Thomp
son,114 the Landers court observed that in hearings before company
107. Landers, 814 F.2d at 42.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Landers, 814 F.2d at 43 (citing Hearings 0/ House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on Railway Labor Act Amendments, H.R. REP. No. 7650, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 44, 89 (1934».
11 \. Id.
112. Id. at 43-44.
113. Id.
114. Butler v. Thompson, 192 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1951) involved a suit by a dining
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officers, "an existing legal contract controls," while before the NRAB,
car employee seeking reinstatement and lost wages resulting from a.dismissal for discipli
nary reasons. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that his RLA company-level representation
rights were violated, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that such rights
existed only to the extent that they were created by a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 833.
The plaintiff argued that RLA section 152, Third bars interference with his choice of
representation. Id. at 832-33 (citing 45 U.S.c. § 152, Third (1982) (for text of § 152, Third,
see supra note 68». The court, however, in a novel analysis, found that section 152, Sixth
limits the scope of the protections extended elsewhere in the Act including those in section
152, Third. Id. at 833 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth (1982».
The Butler court's reliance on section 152, Sixth was unprecedented. Broady v. Illi
nois Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cerro denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951) (for a discussion
of Broady, see infra), which had also denied minority union representation to an employee,
did not refer to this provision. Section 152, Sixth of the RLA provides:
In case of a dispute between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees, aris
ing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements·
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, it shall be the duty of the
designated representative or representatives of such carrier or carriers and of such
employees, within ten days after the receipt of notice of a desire on the part of
either party to confer in respect to such dispute, to specify a time and place at
which such conference shall be held: Provided, (1) That the place so specified
shall be situated upon the line of the carrier involved or as otherwise mutually
agreed upon; and (2) that the time so specified shall allow the designated confer
ees reasonable opportunity to reach such place of conference, but shall not exceed
twenty days from the receipt of such notice: And provided further, That nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to supersede the provisions of any agreement (as
to conferences) then in effect between the parties.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth (1982). The court also pointed to section 152, Fourth, which sets
out the rights of the majority to select a collective bargaining agent and to bargain through
that agent. Butler, 192 F.2d at 833 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982) (for text of
§ 152, Fourth, see supra note 60». The Butler court found that section 152, Fou'rth and
Sixth compel the conclusion that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement must
be observed, including those provisions restricting empl<.>yee representation at a companylevel hearing. Id.
'
The Butler court cited Broady V. Illinois Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73 (7th·Cir.), cerro
denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951), to support its perception that the RLA provides different
representation rights to individual employees as they pass from company-level proceedings
to the NRAB. Butler, 192 F.2d at 833 (citing Broady, 191 F.2d at 76). In investigations
before the NRAB, the RLA governs. At the company level, the Butler court concluded,
the collective bargaining contract determines procedural rights, including representation.
Id.
Broady v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951),
was decided the same year as Butler. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which
later decided McElroy v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 392 F.2d 966 (1968), cerro denied,
393 U.S. 1015 (1969) (for a discussion of McElroy, see supra note 97), determined that the
RLA does not give employees the right to choose their representative at a compimy-Ievel
investigatory proceeding. Broady, 191 F.2d at 76. Broady also arose when a dining car
waiter claimed that his RLA rights were violated when he was denied minority union rep
resentation at a company disciplinary hearing.
The Broady court found "no provision of the Railway Labor Act which gives to em
ployees the right to a representative of their own choice at an investigation by company
officials of a charge that the employee has violated company rules." Id. at 76. First, the
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the RLA governs. I IS The court noted that the proximity of section
153, First(i), which conspicuously omits any mention of representation
rights at the company level, to section 153, FirstG), which specifically
guarantees the right before the NRAB, demonstrates legislative intent
to exclude the choice of representation right at a company-level griev
ance proceeding. 116
The court also rejected Landers' reliance on section 152, Second,
which provides that "disputes between a carrier ... and its ... em
ployees shall be considered ... in conference between representatives"
of the parties interested in the dispute. 117 The court referred to the
provision as "a broadly general reference to the many kinds of contro
versies that might arise, not to specific procedures or to particular
rightS."118 The non-interference language in section 152, Third, added
the Landers court, is also inapplicable to the representation rights of
the individual employee because that provision is designed to prohibit
impairment of the majority's right to choose a collective bargaining
agent. 119
The court next considered Landers' interpretation of section 152,
Eleventh(c), which permits an employee to satisfy the requirement to
be a union member by joining any of the national unions organized in
accordance with the RLA.120 Landers argued that the right to be rep
resented by the union of which an employee is a member should flow
from this provision. 121 Citing Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Rychlik,122
Broady court cited RLA section 153, First(i) which provides that disputes arising from
grievances or contract interpretation "shall be handled in the usual manner up to and in
cluding the chief operating officer of the carrier." Id. at 76-77 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153,
First(i) (1982) (for text of § 153, First(i), see supra note 64)). The court referred, as well, to
section 153, Firsta) which grants, to parties appearing before the NRAB, the right to be
heard "either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively
elect." Id. at 77 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(j) (1982) (for text of § 153, First(j), see supra
note 63)). Resting its decision almost entirely on its interpretation of these two provisions,
the Broady court observed that the statute presented a scheme under which the employee's
right to representation arises only after the company renders a decision adverse to the
employee. [d.
115. Landers, 814 F.2d at 44 (citing Butler v. Thompson, 192 F.2d 831,833 (8th Cir.
1951) (for a discussion of Butler, see supra note 114)).

116. Id.
117. [d. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1982) (for text of § 152, Second, see supra
note 65)).
.
118. Id. (citing General Comm. of Adjustment of the Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs of
the Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 320 U.S. 323, 334 (1943)).
119. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934)).
120. Id. at 44-45 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(c) (1982) (for text of § 152, Elev
enth(c), see supra note 73)).
121. Id. at 45.
122. 352 U.S. 480 (1957).
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the Landers court noted that the purpose of section 152, Eleventh(c)
was to prevent dual unionism and to prevent the shuttling of craft
members between unions. 123 In light of the majority union's interest
in maintaining its status as exclusive representative, argued the court,
section 152, Eleventh(c) should be read narrowly and should not be
interpreted as "implying an automatic right of elective (minority
union) representation at company-level disciplinary hearings."124
The Landers court recognized the existence of precedent contrary
to its view, particularly Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Railroad CO.12S The
Landers court refused to distinguish the facts in Taylor, admitting that
it was "very much in point."126 The court observed, however, that the
Taylor court did not mention the statute's "usual manner" language,
nor did it attempt to discern the "usual manner" of dispute resolution
in the company before it. 127 This analytical step, in the opinion of the
Landers court, should have been controlling in Taylor. 128 Landers
also found fault with Taylor's reliance on McElroy, a case in which
minority union representation was permitted. 129 According to Land
ers, McElroy granted minority union representation due to the pecu
liar circumstance of employees frequently transferring back and forth
between crafts.130 That special circumstance, said the Landers court,
did not exist in either Taylor or Landers. 131 The Landers court also
rejected Coar v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 132 indicating
123. Landers, 814 F.2d at 45 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480, 489
(1957». In Rychlik, the Court explained the plight ofthe railroad worker under a statutory
scheme recognizing union-shop contracts as valid. Railroad labor on the railroads is struc
tured by crafts rather than by industry such that a different union represents each craft.
Another inherent feature of railroad labor is the high degree of mobility ("shuttling") of
individual employees between the crafts. A standard union-shop contract would impose
one of two requirements on shuttling employees. They would need to either join two un
ions (dual unionism) or shuttle between unions as they changed crafts. Both alternatives,
according to Rychlik, were detrimental to the individual employee. Dual unionism
"would, of course, be expensive and sometimes impossible" while shifting between unions
"would be complicated and might mean loss of seniority and union benefits." Rychlik, 352
U.S. at 490 (footnote omitted).
124. Landers, 814 F.2d at 46.
125. Id. at 47 (citing Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 794 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.
1986), cerro denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986) (for a discussion of Taylor, see supra notes 89-101
and accompanying text».
126. Landers, 814 F.2d at 47 (citing Taylor, 794 F.2d at 1086).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. For a discussion of McElroy, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
130. Landers, 814 F.2d at 48 n.4.
131. Id.
132. For a discussion of Coar, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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that Coar suffered from the same deficiencies as did Taylor. 133
B.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Landers v. National
Railroad Passengers Corp. 134 to resolve the conflict between Taylor
and Landers below.l3S Affirming the Landers decision of the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit and rejecting the Taylor view, the Court
concluded that the RLA does not entitle an employee to representa
tion by a union other than the collective bargaining representative. 136
A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice White, followed the ra
tionale of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Landers and cited leg
islative history and policy considerations to support its holding.
The Court's opinion focused on Landers' contention that section
152, Eleventh of the RLAI37 provides railroad operating employees
with the right to minority union representation at company-level
grievance or disciplinary proceedings. Acknowledging that section
152, Eleventh(a) permits a railroad and a union to require all employ
ees, as a condition of employment, to become members of a union, and
that section 152, Eleventh(c) allows employees to satisfy the member
ship requirement by becoming members of a minority union,138 the
Court observed that no provision of the Railway Labor Act defines the
role of a minority union in company-level proceedingS. 139 The Court
also noted that while section 153, FirstG) establishes that once a dis
pute rises to the National Railroad Adjustment Board level, the em
ployee may "be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other
representatives,"I40 section 153, First(i) merely provides that disputes
arising from grievances or interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement "shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including
the chief operating officer of the carrier."141 This construction of sec
tion 153, First, determined the Court, suggests that Congress "did not
believe that the participation of minority unions or other outsiders in
company-level proceedings" was necessary to realize the Act's purpose
133. Landers, 814 F.2d at 48 (citing Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 383).
134. 108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988).
135. Id. at 1442.
136. Id.
137. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982). For text of § 152, Eleventh, see supra notes
72-73.
138. The Court defined a minority union as "a union other than [the employee's]
collective-bargaining representative." Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442.
139. Id.
140. 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(j) (1982). For text of § 153, First(j), see supra note 63.
141. 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(i) (1982). For text of § 153, First(i), see supra note 64.
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but that Congress did consider such representation critical at Adjust
. ment Board proceedings. 142 Referring to legislative history, the Court
cited the lack of congressional action in 1934, in response to proposals
by union and federal agency officials to amend the RLA, as additional
evidence of congressional reluctance to extend a minority union repre
sentation right at the company level. 143 The 1934 amendment propos
als advocated adding express terms guaranteeing minority union
representation to employees pursuing a grievance with their
employer. 144
The Court also presented policy considerations supporting its de
cision. To recognize a statutory right to minority union representation
in proceedings on an employer's property, the Court contended, would
frustrate the statutory purpose expressed in section 151 a(5) of
"provid[ing] for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."14s
Inefficiency and delays would result from the participation in com
pany-level proceedings of representatives unfamiliar with the proce
dural mechanisms established between the employer and the collective
bargaining agent. 146
The Landers Court drew another policy argument from its own
opinion in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,147 as well as from the writ
ings of Professor Archibald Cox, against interpreting the statute to
guarantee company-level minority union representation. In Republic
Steel, the Court explained that the functions of processing grievances
and defending disciplinary charges at the company level complement
the majority union's. exclusive representative status "by permitting it
to participate actively in the continuing administration of the con
tract."148 To permit minority unions to perform this function, as Pro
fessor Cox had argued, would make grievances merely vehicles for
" 'dissident groups ... belong[ing] to rival unions' ': to create friction,
competition, and ultimately employee dissatisfaction. 149
The Court finally returned to Landers' argument that section 152,
142. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 1442 n.3.
144. For a discussion of legislative history surrounding the 1934 proposals for
amendment of the RLA, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
145. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442-43.
146. Id. at 1443.
147. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
148. Id. at 653.
149. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1443 (quoting Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69
HARV. L. REV. 601, 626 (1956)).
.
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Eleventh(c) implicitly extends the right to company-level minority
union representation to railroad employees. The Court referred, as
had the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit below, to Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Rychlik.ISO The Rychlik Court considered similar ar
guments and had concluded "that Congress ... enacted [section 15]2,
Eleventh(c)[ ] for the single narrow purpose of 'prevent[ing] compul
sory dual unionism or the necessity of changing from one union to
another when an employee temporarily changes crafts.' "151 This pur
pose is realized in the facts before the Court. Landers' continued
membership in the minority union is not threatened nor is he required
to also join the majority union. He must merely recognize that the
minority union to which he belongs cannot represent him in company
level grievance and disciplinary proceedings. The Court concluded
that since there is no evidence that the petitioner is likely to suffer
"appreciable prejudice" from the lack of the minority union's repre
sentation or from the majority union's representation, and since the
"duty of fair representation" binds the majority union in this instance,
the petitioner's interests are adequately protected. IS2
III.

EXAMINING THE ARGUMENTS: DOES LANDERS OVERLOOK A
THIRD ALTERNATIVE?

Prior to the Supreme Court's consideration of the issue, the
Landers decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the
Taylor decision last expressed the two opposing interpretations of the
Railway Labor Act's treatment of minority union representation at
company-level grievance or disciplinary proceedings. The judicial
analyses in the two lines of cases represented respectively by Taylor
and Landers attest to statutory language, legislative history, and judi
cial precedent which are so malleable as to have allowed different
courts to persuasively reach opposite conclusions when presented with
identical factual situations. While some courts construed the RLA to
permit employees minority union representation at a company griev
ance hearing regardless of governing collective bargaining contract
provisions,ls3 other courts interpreted the statute to limit employees to
the representation which their employers and collective bargaining
agents determined to be appropriate. IS4 With Landers, the Supreme
150.

352 U.S. 480 (1957). For an explanation ofthe Rychlik rationale, see supra note

123.

151. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1443 (citing Rychlik, 352 U.S. at 492).
152. Id. at 1444.
.
153. See supra note 85.
154. See supra note 84.
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Court reduced the possibility of future inconsistencies in interpretation
of the employee's right to minority union representation at the com
pany level. However, the Landers Court also declined to address the
compelling rationales guiding the Taylor court and others to the con
trary conclusion. Rather than acknowledging the persuasiveness of
arguments for protecting both the individual's right to the representa
tion of the union he or she has chosen and the majority union's inter
est in preserving its strength as the exclusive bargaining representative,
the Court recognized the rationale defending only the latter interest.
In interpreting the scant legislative history on the issue of com"'
pany-level minority union representation, for example, the Court
failed to recognize both schools of thought. The legislative history
consists primarily of testimony before the House Committee on Inter
state and Foreign Commerce in 1934 by Commissioner Eastman.1SS
During congressional hearings held to consider amending the RLA in
1934, Commissioner Eastman testified:
When it comes to collective bargaining in the matter of wages and
working conditions, it seems to me plain that a company ought not
be compelled to deal with more than one organization. It ought not
to have to make bargains with two or three different organizations.
But when it comes to the presentation of grievances, that is a differ
ent matter, and certainly an individual employee ought not to be
stopped in any way from taking his grievance up directly with man
agement, and I think that ought to apply to any group of
employees. 156

Congress, in fact, amended the RLA in 1934. 157 The courts, however,
disagreed on the significance of the Commissioner's statements. The
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Coar
v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,158 assumed that Eastman's con
cerns were embodied, albeit not expressly, in the amended statute. "If
an individual may present his own grievances," it concluded, "it fol
lows that he may designate the representative of his choice to do like
wise."159 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Landers, on
the other hand, not seeing Eastman's perceptions embodied in the
155. Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 384.
156. Hearings of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the Rail
way Labor Act, H.R. REP. No. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1934).
157. Railway Labor Act Amendment, ch. 691,48 Stat. 1185 (1934). See H.R. REP.
No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1934).
158. 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
159. Id. at 384 (citing Hearings of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com
merce on the Railway Labor Act, H.R. REP. No. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1934». For
a discussion of Coar, see supra note 92.
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amended statute's express language, reasoned that Eastman "lobbied
for amendments which never saw the legislative light of day."I60 The
Landers court further observed that, because Eastman considered such
changes necessary, and since corresponding language was not inserted
into the statute in 1934, such a right did not exist either before or after
the 1934 amendment. 161 The Supreme Court adopted the analysis of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, disregarding Coar's reasonable
contention that, in 1934, the statute already contemplated some com
pany-level minority union representation rights which Commissioner
Eastman merely wished to see documented as express statutory
provisions. 162
As with the legislative history, the Landers Court avoided a dis
cussion of the conflicting meanings derivable from the express statu
tory provisions referring to a railroad employee's representation and
procedural rights at company-level proceedings. The definition of
"representative" appearing in section 151, for example, was cited as
support by courts of appeals and district courts both upholding and
denying minority union representation under the RLA. Section 151,
Sixth provides that a representative is "any . . . union . . . designated
either by a carrier . . . or by its or their employees, to act for it or
them."163 In General Committee 0/ Adjustment 0/ Brotherhood 0/ Lo
comotive Engineers/or Pacific Lines o/Southern Pacific Co. v. Southern
Pacific Co., 164 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted
160. Landers, 814 F.2d at 43.
161. Id.
162. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442 n.3.
163. 45 U.S.C. § 151, Sixth (1982). See infra note 164 for text of statute.
164. 132 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1942), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 320 U.S. 338
(1943). The General Committee court also faced the issue of whether a collective bargain
ing representative for a particular craft or class must be the exclusive representative of an
individual member ofthat craft or class in disputes stemming from the individual's employ
ment contract. Id. at 195-96. The court found that a collective bargaining contract be
tween a carrier and an engineers' union, covering wages and working conditions of
engineers, cannot legitimately bar a firemen's union from representing an engineer at a
grievance hearing if the engineer is a member of the firemen's union. Id.
The General Committee court focused initially on RLA section 152, Fourth, particu
larly the language in that section which provides that "nothing in this Act shall be con
strued to prohibit a carrier from permitting an employee . . . from conferring with
management during working hours without loss oftime." Id. at 196 n.3 (citing 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Fourth (1982) (for text of § 152, Fourth, see supra note 60». The court also noted
that section 152, Eighth requires all individual employment contracts to include the express
provisions of section '152, Fourth. RLA section 152, Eighth provides:
Every carrier shall notify its employees by printed notices in such form and
posted at such times and places as shall be specified by the Mediation Board that
all disputes between the carrier and its employees will be handled in accordance
with the requirements of this chapter, and in such notices there shall be printed
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the words "any ... union" to mean any union "whether [representing]
a majority or minority of a craft."165 At least one other court, in con
trast, focused on the word "them," and observing that it is a plural
verbatim, in large type, the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of this section. The
provisions of said paragraphs are made a part of the contract of employment
between the carrier and each employee, and shall be held binding upon the par
ties, regardless of any other express or implied agreements between them.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eighth (1982). Construing the language of section 152, Fourth and
Eighth together, the court stated that "[o]bviously, this right of conference by the engineer
individually with the employer, includes the right to confer as an individual concerning
claims that the Railway has failed to perform the individual's contract." General Comm.,
132 F.2d at 196.
The General Committee court distinguished between a collective bargaining agreement
and an individual employment contract. Relying on Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S.
515 (1937), it noted that "[t]he individual engineer in making his contract has the right also
to negotiate for and agree to any terms of employment with the Railway, and is not re
quired by the Act to accept the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of the Engineers'
Schedule[,] [the Engineers' collective agreement]." General Comm, 132 F.2d at 196 (citing
Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937». Consequently, the court stated, the
Firemen's Committee has the lawful right to represent any individual in the presentation of
"any type or class of individual claims or grievances ... and plaintiff [Engineer's Commit
tee] does not have the sole ... right of representation." Id. at 197.
In reaching its decision, the General Committee court specifically referred to RLA
section 153, First(i), which requires that grievances at the initial or company level be han
dled "in the usual manner." Id. at 197-98 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(i) (1982». Citing
the statutory language, the General Committee court observed that section 153, First(i)
encompasses disputes between an "employee" and a railway. General Comm., 132 F.2d at
198. The court explained that the phrase "an employee" connotes disputes over individual
employment contracts as opposed to collective agreements. Id. It reasoned that because
section 152, Eighth requires that section 152, Fourth, guaranteeing employees the right to
confer with their employer individually or through a local representative, be a written part
of any individ~al·employment contract, employees may confer with the employer regarding
the grievance either individually or through a local representative. Id. The court con
cluded that the phrase "in the usual manner" meant "the steps usually taken by an engi
neer personally or by his representative through ... the chief operating officer." Id.
The General Committee court also illustrated circumstances in which imposing exclu
sive representation would be inequitable. Id. at 198. If three engineers, for example, assert
that they are entitled to a position by their seniority and the union predetermines which of
the three it believes is eligible, the other two employees are less likely to enjoy zealous
representation before railway management from the exclusive representative. Id. Simi
larly, employees who are delinquent in paying union dues or who are critical of the major
ity union are justified in expecting less than wholehearted representation from the exclusive
representative. Id. The court pointed to section lSI, Sixth, which defines "representative."
General Comm., 132 F.2d at 199 (citing 45 U.S.c. § lSI, Sixth (1982». RLA section lSI,
Sixth provides: "The term 'representative' means any person or persons, labor union, or
ganization, or corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or
their employees, to act for it or them." 45 U.S.C. § lSI, Sixth (1982). The General Come
mittee court concluded that "any . . . labor union" necessarily means even a minority
union. General Comm., 132 F.2d at 199. Only in collective bargaining must a union be
chosen by the majority. Id.
165. General Comm., 132 F.2d at 199. For a discussion of General Committee, see
supra note 164.
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form reference to employees, construed the language to exclude appli
cability of the provision to an individual in a grievance matter. 166 The
Supreme Court disregarded section 151 altogether in Landers.
The Landers Court made no mention of either section 152, Sec
ond or section 152, Third. Section 152, Second provides that "[a]ll
disputes ... shall be considered ... in conference between representa
tives [of the] employees ... interested in the dispute,"167 while section
152, Third proscribes interference with employees' choice of unions. 168
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined in McElroy
v. .Terminal Railroad Association ofSt. Louis 169 that section 152, Sec
ond, on its face, guarantees an individual the choice of any representa
tive.l7° The McElroy court also interpreted section 152, Third, the
non-interference. provision, as a guarantee to individuals against inter
ference with choosing their own representatives. 171 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Landers, referred to section 152, Second as "a
broadly general reference to the many kinds of controversies that
might arise, not to specific procedures or to particular rights in dispute
resolution proceedings between parties."I72 The non-interference lan
guage of section 152, Third, the court of appeals added, was intended
to prevent employers' meddling with the majority's choice of a union
representative. 173 The Supreme Court, however, chose to steer clear
of the inherent ambiguity of section 152, Second and section 152,
Third by not discussing the provisions whatsoever, despite the appar
ent applicability of the express statutory language to the issue at hand.
The thrust of the Supreme Court's rationale in Landers lies in the
Court's interpretation of the language of section 152, Eleventh (a) and
(c) and of the purpose of the provision's enactment. The Landers
Court observed that section 152, Eleventh (a) permits a collective bar
gaining agreement to require that an employee belong to a union as an
employment condition. 174 The Court also noted' that section 152,
Eleventh(c) provides that membership in anyone of the national labor
166. D'Amico v. Pennsylvania R.R., 191 F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). For a
discussion of D'Amico, see supra note 104.
167. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1982). For text of § 152, Second, see supra note 65.
168. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1982). For text of § 152, Third, see supra note 68.
169. 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), cerro denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). For a discus
sion of McElroy, see supra note 97.
170. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 968·69 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1982) (for text of
§ 152, Second, see supra note 65».
171. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 969 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1982) (for text of
§ 152, Third, see supra note 68».
172. Landers, 814 F.2d at 44.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(a) (1982».
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organizations satisfies the Eleventh(a) requirement. 17S The Court con
cluded that the only purpose of section 152, Eleventh(c)'s enactment
was to protect railroad employees, who were frequently shifted be
tween crafts, from having to join multiple unions. 176 The Court dis
missed the petitioner employee's section 152, Eleventh(a) and (c)
arguments without addressing all of their merits. Landers' arguments
resemble the conclusions of the Coar court. The Coar court inter
preted the statutory scheme comprised by section 152, Eleventh(a)
and (c) to include implicitly the "right to enjoy the privileges of mem
bership, including representation by [the minority] union."177 The
Landers Court did not identify what benefit, if any, an employee can
derive from membership in a minority union when representation by
that union is not available.
The Supreme Court's Landers decision also discussed section 153,
First(i) and section 153, FirstG) again expressing, however, only the
interpretation which supports denial of minority union representation
despite longstanding debate in the lower courts over their composite
meaning. In 1937, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Estes
v. Union Terminal Co. 178 determined that the guarantees made ex
175. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(c) (1982».
176. [d. at 1443.
177. Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 382 (emphasis added) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh(a)
and (c) (1982».
178. 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937). The Estes
court was the first to recognize a right to representation at a company-level hearing by a
representative other than the majority union. Id. at 770. The case arose when a union
employee brought a claim for a non-union employee's work position on the grounds of
seniority. The NRAB ruled in favor of the union employee but did so without notifying the
non-union employee of the impending hearing. The court addressed the preliminary issue
of whether the non-union member was a "party," within the meaning of RLA section 153,
FirstG) of the RLA, and thus was due the rights of notice and choice of representation in
proceedings before the NRAB. Once the Estes court found that the non-union employee
was "involved" in the dispute as contemplated by section 153, FirstG), and, therefore, was a
"party," the court proceeded to interpret the right of representation to which the employee
was entitled under the Railway Labor Act. Id. The court found that "[u]nder the plain
provisions of the act an employee may conduct his negotiations with his employer and the
proceedings before the Board, if necessary, either personally or through a chosen represen
tative, which mayor may not be a labor organization." Id. (emphasis added).
Although not deciding the issue of "representation at a company-level proceeding,"
the Estes court found the right to choose a representative at the company level implicit in
the "plain provisions of the Railway Labor Act." Id. The court cited only section 153,
FirstG) as support. Id. (citing Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, § 3,44 Stat. 577 (1926)
as amended by Railway Labor Act Amendment, ch. 691, § 3,48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (current
version at 45 U.S.C. § 153, FirstG) (1982) (for text of § 153, FirstG), see supra note 63».
Literally read, however, that section applies only to proceedings before the NRAB. Other
courts after Estes restricted its guarantees of representation to Board proceedings. Landers
v. National R.R. Passengers Corp., 814 F.2d 41, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
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pressly in section 153, First(j) regarding free choice of representation
at the NRAB are implicitly applicable to company-level hearings since
the NRAB proceedings are merely an extension of the matter at the
company level. 179 The Supreme Court instead appeared to rely on a
view espoused earlier in Broady v. Illinois Central Railroad 180 by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Broady court focused
on the juxtaposition of section 153, First(j) with section 153, First(i),
observing that, in imposing procedural requirements to be met at the
company level, section 153, First(i) requires that grievances be han
dled "in the usual manner" while not mentioning any representation
rights as does section 153, First(j).l81 This distinction between the
otherwise related. provisions, as stressed in Landers as it was in
Broady, indicates that the right to unrestricted representation is avail
able only before the NRAB.l82
The RLA's express provisions lend themselves, either by design·
or by congressional oversight, to at least two vastly different interpre
tations on the issue of minority union representation at the company
level. Case law at the federal court of appeals and district court levels
developed two irreconcilable and extreme positions before the
Supreme Court's Landers decision. By denying either majority union
participation or individual employee choice of representation in com
pany-level grievance proceedings, neither of the two opposing inter
pretations achieved the delicate balance called for, by the spirit and
letter of the RLA, between the competing interests of exclusive bar
gaining representative and individual employee. 183 Instead, both ap
1440 (1988); D'Amico v. Pennsylvania R.R., 191 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Switchmen's Union ofN. Am. v. Louisville and N. R.R., 130 F. Supp. 220, 227 (W.O. Ky.
1955). But see McElroy v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 392 F.2d 966, 969-70 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
179. Estes, 89 F.2d at 770.
180. 191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951). For a discussion of
Broady, see supra note 114.
181. Id. at 76-77.
182. Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1442; Broady, 191 F.2d at 77.
183. Because the lower courts found the RLA's legislative history and language to be
a flexible statutory scheme, they interpreted specific RLA provisions on an ad hoc basis,
attempting to realize the Act's purposes. In Broady v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951), and Butler v. Thompson, 192 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.
1951), for example, the complaining employees both sought representation from officers of
"rival unions." Broady, 191 F.2d at 76; Butler, 192 F.2d at 832. This common distinction
of Broady and Butler was identified in McElroy v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 392 F.2d
966,971 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). The McElroy court indicated
that in Broady, as well as in Butler, "the employee sought to be represented not by a union
with a collective bargaining contract with the railroad, but by a 'rival union.' "Id. The
court then specified that the "term 'rival union' as used herein excludes those unions de
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proaches protected one interest at the expense of the other.
fined in Section [15]2 Eleventh(c) of the Railway Labor Act and qualified by the National
Mediation Board." Id. at 971 n.ll. The decisions to deny the representation in both
Broady and Butler were consistent with the Act's policy objectives of (1) preserving the
collective bargaining power of the majority unions and other nationally organized and cer
tified unions; (2) preserving the peace between nationally recognized labor organizations
and the railroads; and (3) protecting the continued flow of interstate commerce. For dis
cussion of RLA policy objectives, see Taylor v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 794 F.2d 1082, 1086
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986). See also RLA AT FIFTY, supra note 13, at 2,
13. Neither case, however, cited these policy objectives as. the rationale for its interpreta
tion.
The RLA's ambiguity on the issue of minority union representation at company-level
hearings resulted in other trends in court decisions which do not appear related to any
identified statutory policy objectives. A survey of the-decisions issued between Estes v.
Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937), in 1937, and McElroy v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n of St. L., 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969), in 1968,
reveals a strong correlation between the facts surrounding the claims of individual employ
ees and whether the courts granted them the desired minority union representation. Estes
involved a railroad's removal of an employee from a work position in violation of the col
lective bargaining agreement's seniority scheme. Estes, 89 F.2d at 769-70. For a discussion
of Estes, see supra note 178. In General Comm. of Adjustment of Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs for Pac. Lines of S. Pac. CO. V. Southern Pac. Co., 132 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1942),
rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 320 U.S. 338 (1943), the employer railroad denied certain
benefits claimed, by the employee, to be guaranteed to him under his individual employ
ment contract. General Comm., 132 F.2d at 197. For a discussion of General Comm., see
supra note 164. Later, in McElroy, the representation issue arose when seventeen employ
ees filed claims against the employer, most of them claiming that the employer failed to
maintain certain working conditions. McElroy, 392 F.2d at 967. For a discussion of McEl
roy, see supra note 97. In the three cases mentioned, all arguably involving injUdicious
behavior by the railroad, the respective courts found that the RLA provides individual
employees the right to minority union representation at company-level proceedings. In
Broady, Butler, and Switchmen's Union of N. Am. V. Louisville and N. R.R., 130 F. Supp.
220 (W.O. Ky. 1955), the courts faced employees accused of disciplinary infractions. In
these cases, which involved possibly improvident behavior by the individual employees, the
results were different. The courts determined that the RLA does not provide minority
union representation to an employee at company-level proceedings. Butler, 192 F.2d at
832-33; Broady, 191 F.2d at 75-77; Switchmen's Union, 130 F. Supp. at 221-25. For a
discussion of Broady, see supra note 114. For a discussion of Butler, see supra note 114.
For a discussion of Switchmen's Union, see supra note 103. Coar V. Metro-North Com
muter R.R., 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), and Taylor, decided in 1985 and 1986
respectively, were the first cases to hold that there is a right to minority union representa
tion at the company level in factual situations involving disciplinary proceedings. Taylor,
794 F.2d at 1086; Coar, 618 F. Supp. at 381, 384; for a discussion of Taylor, see supra notes
86-101 and accompanying text; for a discussion of Coar, see supra note 92.
The RLA's equivocation on the question of minority union representation in minor
dispute resolution proceedings at the company level even allowed the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit to reach opposite decisions in Broady and McElroy. In Broady, the
court denied minority union representation during company-level disciplinary hearings. In
McElroy, however, the same court granted minority union representation seventeen years
later in a case involving affirmative employee claims. The McElroy court distinguished
Broady by focusing on the fact that the Broady employees sought representation by a "ri
val" union which was not nationally certified in accordance with section 152, Eleventh(c).
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By granting certiorari in Landers, the Supreme Court assumed
the task of clarif~ing the contours of an employee's right under the
RLA to minority union representation at company-level proceedings.
It appears that the Court had three alternatives before it: (1) to find
that, as Taylor found, there is an undeniable right to minority union
representation in all instances of a minor dispute at the company level,
thereby protecting the individual employee's associational freedoms
identified in the RLA; (2) to find that, as the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit established in Landers, an employee is 'limited to the mi
nority union representation rights created by the collective bargaining
agreement, thereby defending the majority union's interests. in preserv
ing exclusive representation which are also identified in the RLA; or,
(3) to reach a third interpretation which, at least partially, protects
both the individual employee's and the majority union's RLA rights
concurrently.
.
The conflict between the lower courts invited the Landers Court
to restore adherence to the RLA's multiple purposes and to avoid the
one dimensional results of both prevailing views. A third RLA inter
pretation, unlike the interpretations of both Taylor and, Landers be
low, might better embody the spirit of the RLA by effectively striking
a practicable compromise between the majority's organizational inter
ests and the individual employee's associational freedom as well as by
satisfying all of the statute's express language. The Supreme Court,
however, chose to affirm the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, thereby declining to fashion an interpretation fostering a
balance between the majority and individual employee interests.
IV.

THE ELGIN, JOLIET

& EASTERN RAILWAY CO. V. BURLEY

ANALOGY: A NEED TO BALANCE THE INTERESTS

The statutory provisions and their interpretations which today
comprise the Railway Labor Act represent the sixty year development
of an equitable balance among the interests of the government, rail
roads, exclusive bargaining representatives, and individual employees,
which accommodates the essential continued operation of the indus
try. The most exhaustive judicial discussion of the individual em
ployee's position in this balance appears in the 1945 Supreme Court
decision Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway.184 The Burley Court ob
served that the individual employee's interests are not wholly subMcElroy. 392 F.2d at ·971. The McElroy court considered the "rival union" distinction
adequate grounds to justify' reaching a different result from Broady. Id.
184. 325 U.S. 711. 738 (1945). adhered to. 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
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merged in the collective int~rest.18s Perhaps the application of
principles described in Burley might have led the Landers Court to a
different result. The following sections first describe the evolution. by
which the various interests in the railway labor environment reached
their current disposition and then review the Burley principles de
lineating individual employee rights under the RLA.
A.

Railroad Labor Legislation: Traditional Interests and the.
Emergence of the Individual Employee's Interests

The frequent succession of ineffective railway labor legislation be
tween 1888, when the Arbitration Act was enacted, and 1926, the year
of the RLA's passage, convinced Congress that, to protect the national
interest in uninterrupted operation of the railroads, a statute could not
rely principally on governmental arbitration as a means of settling rail
road labor disputes. In passing the RLA, as drafted by the unions and
the railroads jointly, Congress recognized that the country's interests
would be best served by a self-balancing system of collective bargain
ing backed up by voluntary mediation. Through the RLA, Congress
rested the health of interstate commerce on the delicate balance of
power between labor unions and the railroads. The protection of the
federal interest lay in the preservation of a peaceful coexistence be
tween railroads and labor unions.
Railroads and unions, however, historically did not enjoy equal
footing in negotiations. 186 To reinforce the inherently less stable un
ions in this critical balance, Congress and the courts developed the
concept of "exclusivity."187 RLA section 152, Fourth provides that
the majority of any craft or class of employees shall determine who
will be the representative of the craft or class. 188 Congress intended,
through the RLA, to make the majority-selected representative the ex
clusive collective bargaining agent for all employees in a craft.
185. Id. at 733.
186. RLA AT FIFTY, supra note 13, at 25.
187. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SEC
TOR 152 (1977). The authors note that:
To remedy the "inequality of bargaining power" between employers and unor
ganized employees, Congress not only guaranteed employees the right to organize
but also declared that the representative chosen by a majority of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit is the exclusive representative for all unit employ
ees. The unit chosen by the majority, therefore, represents even those who vote
for another union or for no-union. This principle of exclusivity, almost unique to
the United States, is fundamental to national labor policy and the collective bar
gaining process.
Id.
188. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982). For text of § 152, Fourth, see supra note 60.
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Congressional indulgence in strengthening the majority unions
through codification of the exclusivity principle, however, had the im
portant consequence of encroaching upon the interests of yet another
party in railroad labor relations, the individual employee. 189 As the
Supreme Court said in J.1 Case Co. v. NLRB 190 concerning the some
what similar National Labor Relations Act, "[t]he very· purpose of
providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the
terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect
the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the
group." 191
Professor Benjamin Aaron observes, however, that the statutory
powers given to the unions by the RLA made it inevitable that the
"courts would read into them a corresponding duty by unions to exer
cise that power reasonably and fairly."192 In Steele v. Louisville & N.
R.R.,193 the Supreme Court explained the union's general duty of fair
representation inherent in its authority as a bargaining representative.
Steele involved non-union blacks whose jobs as firemen in diesel loco
motives on southern railroads were coveted by white union members.
The Court concluded that the union, in "collective bargaining and in
making contracts with the carrier, ... [must] represent non-union or
minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith."194 Steele assuaged somewhat
the concerns of non-union and minority union employees that their
interests would be ignored by collective agents negotiating collective
bargaining agreements with the railroads. It did not, however, ap
pease those who recognized that, in the con~ext of individual griev
ances, claims arise about which an individual and the majority union
will unavoidably differ.19S It was not until Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Rail
189. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 187, at 152.
190. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
191. Id. at 338.
192. Aaron, The Union's Duty ofFair Representation Under the Railway Labor and
National Labor Relations Acts, 341. AIR L. & COM. 167, 167 (1968); see also Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62-65 (1975); Summers,
The Rights ofIndividual Workers, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082 (1984); Kroner, Disciplinary
Hearings Under the Railway Labor Act: A Survey ofAdjustment Board Awards, 46 MINN.
L. REV. 277 (1961).
193. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
194. Id. at 204.
195. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 362, 393 (1962). In the context of both the RLA and the analogous
NLRA, Professor Summers indicates that "[m]ost grievances involve some factual issue,
and the union, by rejecting the employees' version, can act 'responsible' and wear the face
of fairness." Id. He adds: "The individual's interest may more often be vitiated without
vindictiveness or deliberate discrimination." Id.
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way Co. v. Burley 196 that the Supreme Court found that the RLA
guarantees individual employees the right to act on their own behalf in
resolving "minor disputes" before the NRAB.197
Prior to Burley, the unions generally denied employees the right
to process their own grievances on the theory that the exclusive bar
gaining agent enjoyed complete authority to settle grievances as well
as to negotiate collective agreements. 198 Burley, however, observed
that Congress distinguished "disputes concerning the making of col
lective agreements" from "disputes over grievances."199 The first class
of disputes, the Court explained, arises when there is no collective
agreement or when the employer or the majority union seeks to
change the terms of an agreement. "They look to the acquisition of
rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested
in the past."200 These future-looking disputes, known as major dis
putes, involve the "larger" issues over which strikes may arise, conse
quently threatening railroad traffic. 201
Burley also defines minor disputes. Minor disputes appear in the
administration or carrying out of a collective agreement and are the
"smaller differences" which develop in the course of employment. 202
They are individual in nature and unlikely to disrupt peaceful labor
management relations or railroad traffic. 203
In Burley, the petitioner, a labor union, while recognizing that
there are two distinct types of disputes, urged the Court to find that
the RLA makes the collective agent the employees' exclusive represen
tative for either type of dispute. 204 In particular, the union sought to
have declared valid its exclusive representation of employees in griev
325 u.s. 711 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
Id. at 738. In Burley, a group of majority union member employees filed a
grievance through the union seeking back pay for violations by the railroad of starting time
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. The union routed the grievance through
the standard grievance handling procedure. Finally, however, in exchange for the insertion
of a new express provision in the collective bargaining agreement creating employee rights
in the case of similar future railroad violations, the union agreed to withdraw the grievance
originated by the group of employees. The employees objected to the settlement and
brought suit seeking back pay for the violations. The railroad contested the suit arguing
that the union had settled the grievance on the employees' behalf. The Supreme Court held
that, in the absence of express authorization by the individual employees, the union could
not represent the employees in settling grievances at the NRAB. Id. at 711-18.
198. Aaron, supra note 192, at 169.
199. Burley, 325 U.S. at 722-23.
200. Id. at 723.
201. Id. at 723-24.
202. Id. at 724.
203. Id. at 723-24.
204. Id. at 731.
196.

197.
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ance matters before the NRAB. The Court, however, found that
"such a view of the statute's effects, in so far [sic] as it would deprive
the aggrieved employee of effective voice in any settlement and of indi
vidual hearing before the Board, would be contrary to the clear import
of its provisions and to its policy."205 The Burley Court concluded
that while a union, as collective bargaining agent, is empowered to
make settlements for the future, it is not entitled to assume authority
to settle claims or provide representation for employees in all in
stances. 206 In minor disputes, the collective agent may act as a repre
sentative before the NRAB only when the individuals involved
authorize it to do SO.207 The Burley Court held that for an NRAB
decision to be valid, it must appear that, if the collective bargainer is to
represent the employee at the NRAB, the employee authorized the
union in some legally sufficient way to act in his or her behalf. 208
B.. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley: A Basis for the
Individual Employee's Right to Minority Union
Representation. in the Handling of Company-Level
Grievances
Burley only determined the collective agent's right to represent
employees at NRAB proceedings. It specifically declined to determine
whether Congress intended the RLA "to leave the settlement of griev
ances altogether to the individual workers, excluding the collective
agent entirely except as [the employees] may specifically authorize it to
act for them."209 In describing the individual employee's representa
tion rights in NRAB proceedings, however, Burley suggests that simi
lar rights exist in the context of company-level hearings.
The Burley Court reasoned that Congress could not have in
tended, by the 1934 RLA amendments, "to submerge wholly the indi
vidual and minority interests, with all power to act concerning them,
in the collective interest and agency."210 The Court focused on RLA
section 152, Fourth, which reserves the right of " 'an employee indi
vidually' to confer with management. "211 Burley interpreted section
152, Fourth as assuring the employees' right to confer with their em
ployer regarding individual grievances. The legislative history, the
205.
206:
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at '733.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 741.
jd. at 738.
Id. at· 737.
Id. at 733.
.
Id. at 734 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982) (emphasis added in Burley».
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Court added, supports such an interpretation. 212
In a 1946 opinion construing Burley, Attorney General Clark ex
plained that section 153, First(j), which guarantees to employees the
right to choose their representative before the NRAB, creates a
"strong inference" that they have a similar right in negotiations before
the employer. 213 Attorney General Clark added that this inference be
comes stronger by virtue of the fact that employees can ultimately
bring suit, with the assistance of counsel, to enforce a NRAB find
ing. 214 Individual employees may designate as their representative,
Attorney General Clark concluded, either the collective agent or "any
other union or person otherwise qualified to act."2IS The employee
has the statutory right to negotiate either personally or by a chosen
.
representative. 216
The Burley Court, however, also acknowledged the need for lim
iting the individual's representation right at the company level. The
Court noted that even if a controversy is a "minor dispute," the collec
tive agent may still have an interest in its resolution by virtue of the
likely impact on the majority's future wages and working condi
tions. 217 The uncertainty surrounding the future impact of a grievance
proceeding at the negotiations or company level suggests that the ma
jority union has a strong interest in participating in such hearings.
"The statute," said the Court, "does not expressly exclude grievances
from the collective agent's dut[ies] .... Both collective and individual
interests may be concerned in the settlement where . . . the dispute
concerns all members alike."218
Id: at 735.
40 Op. Att'yGen. 494, 497 (1946).
214. Id. at 497.
215. Id. at 499.
216. Id. at 499-500.
217. Burley, 325 u.s. at 737.
218. Id. The second major issue raised in Burley involved the manner in which the
bargaining agent obtains the authorization from an employee to act as the representative in
a grievance hearing before the NRAB. The majority union and the employer cannot, as the
Court determined, nullify the employee's individual rights with a collective bargaining
agreement. The Court revisited this issue in a rehearing of the Burley case two years later.
See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). The second opinion, while "adher
ing" to the first, suggested that "custom and usage," a union's by-laws, or its constitution,
might extend to the majority union the authority to act as representative for its members
before grievance hearings. Id. at 663 n.2. It cautioned, however, that it was not creating an
"all-inclusive rule" by which a union could obtain blanket representation authorization.
Id. at 663. In response to the decision, unions in the late 1940's modified their by-laws and
constitutions, declaring that voluntary membership in a union authorized representation at
grievance hearings.
The appeasement evident in the Burley rehearing appeared to be aimed at simplifying
212.

213.
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While Burley firmly establishes the right of minority union repre
sentation at the NRAB, its language is equivocal, as is the statute,
about the scope of that right at the company level. The decision rec
ognizes that individuals enjoy rights, "separate and distinct" from the
majority union's entitlements, in minor disputes. 219 On the other
hand, Burley also brings attention to the possibility that an employee's
claim may concern the collective majority. The Burley Court declined
to address the specific question of minority union representation at the
company level which already had been raised in Estes v. Union Termi
nal Co. 220 and General Committee ofAdjustment ofBrotherhood ofLo
comotive Engineers for Pacific Lines ofSouthern Pacific Co. v. Southern
Pacific Co..221 As a result, two federal courts of appeals in McElroy v.
Terminal Railroad Association ofSt. Louis 222 and Taylor 223 were able
to justify finding that an employee has a right, implicitly guaranteed
by the RLA, to be represented by a minority union in a minor dispute
at the company level while three other courts of appeals, in Broady v.
Illinois Central Railroad,224 Butler v. Thompson,225 and Landers v. Na
tional Railroad Passenger Corp., 226 decided that a majority union can
preclude such minority union representation by denying the right in
the collective bargaining agreement. The lack of precise language in
Burley contribut,ed to the subsequent split between the lower courts
and, as a result, to the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Land
ers. Burley's 'description of the nature of the individual employee's
rights under the RLA should have served as a springboard from which
the Landers Court could proceed. Instead, the Landers opinion ab
stains from recognizing any individual employee rights in the context
of company-level proceedings, finding that, in the absence of a con
tractual agreement to the contrary, the exclusive bargaining represen
the matter of establishing the majority union's authority to represent an individual majority
union member. The decision left open the question of how a minority union member
manifests authorization permitting the majority union to act as representative before the
NRAB. In that matter, the first Burley opinion's requirement of express authorization
appears to have remained unfettered.
219. Burley, 325 U.S. at 738.
220. 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937). For a discussion of Estes, see supra note 178.
221. 132 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1942), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 320 U.S. 338
(1943). For a discussion of General Comm., see supra note 164.
222. 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). For a discus
sion of McElroy, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
223. 794 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986). For a discus
sion of Taylor, see supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
224. 191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951). For a discussion of
Broady, see supra note 114.
225. 192 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1951). For a discussion of Butler, see supra note 114.
226. 814 F.2d 41 (Ist Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988).
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tative enjoys an unfettered right to represent any employee in
grievances or disciplinary matters regardless of the employee's union
membership.227
.
In a general discussion about the relationship between a collective
unit and an individual under a collective bargaining agreement, Pro
fessor Summers suggests that interpretations of the governing statute,
whether the RLA or the NLRA,228 which unconditionally either grant
or deny a right to an individual, defeat the spirit of the statute:
The interests of the collective parties and the .interests of the indi
vidual employees do not stand in simple opposition to each other;
they cannot be lumped for. weighing on the scale of judgment to
determine whether individuals should or should not have rights
under collective agreements. The interests do not clash directly,
and the choice is not whether the union should have complete con
trol or the individual full independence. 229

The proper inquiry must be similar to that which guided Congress
through the legislative process which generated the RLA: what inter
pretation of the RLA consistently best serves the interests of all the
parties involved?
While Burley provided the courts, such as those which decided
the Taylor and Landers lines of cases, 'with language supporting either
of two opposite conclusions regarding minority union representation,
a careful construction of that language also suggests a third interpreta
tion more consistent with Professor Summers' caveats.' In construing
the RLA, Burley recogniz.es several principles which, molded-together,
present a scheme for distributing the representation right between the
majority union and the individual minority union member as a func
tton of the nature of the elaim presente~ by the employee; . .
First, the Burley Court recognized that the RLA "vests exclusive
authority to negotiate and to conclude agreements concerning major
disputes" in the majority union.230 "This ... authority," the Burley
Court determined, "includes representation of the employees ... in
the stage of conference [at the company level],"231 An employee,
therefore, cannot seek modification ofa collective bargaining contract,
or creation of a new one, by negotiating either individually or through
a minority union with the employer. Collective bargaining is the ex
227.

Landers, 108 S. Ct. at 1443-44.

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982).
Summers, supra note 195, at 395.
230. Burley, 325 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added); see also Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335-37 (1944);
231. Burley, 325 U.S. at 729; see als.o 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982).
228.
229.
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clusive domain of the majority union, which must observe the "duty of
fair representation" identified in Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R.. 232
Where an employee's claim arises from interpretation of a collec
tive agreement and it pertains primarily to rights in the past, the claim
will be classified as a "minor dispute."233 The Burley holding partially
defined the representation rights of individual employees in minor dis
putes. The Court recognized that in minor disputes, unlike in major
disputes, the individual is entitled to participate in the dispute resolu
tion process. It observed that the RLA grants to the individual em
ployee the rights "to share in the negotiations [concerning a minor
dispute], to be heard before the Board [NRAB], to have notice, and to
bring the enforcement suit."234 The Court concluded that these rights
cannot be realized by the individual if the majority union has the abso
lute statutory authority to foreclose individual employees' claims alto
gether through exclusive representative status in minor disputes. 235
Burley, therefore, indicates that the RLA denies any individual or mi
nority union partiCipation at any stage of major disputes but grants the
individual the right to share, to some extent, in dispute negotiations at
the company level.
The second Burley principle adaptable to a scheme for parcelling
representation rights between the minority union employee and the
majority union is Burley'S suggestion that it is patently unfair to im
pose majority union exclusive representation on an individual em
ployee when the employee and the exclusive agent, in a grievance
matter, seek disparate results from the dispute resolution process. 236
This Burley observation invites a dispute resolution mechanism which,
once a "minor dispute" is established, avoids this unfair result by
granting minority union representation at least wherever majority
union and individual employee interests material to the grievance
conflict.
The third principle which can be drawn from Burley as a tool in
constructing a comprehensive representation scheme for minor dis
putes at the company level is that there are instances in which "the
dispute concerns all members alike, and settlement hangs exclusively
232. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Steele postulated that, in the context of collective bargain
ing, the statutory authority given to the majority union carries a concurrent responsibility
to represent each employee in the unit on a non-discriminatory basis. Id. at 204. For a
discussion of Steele's impact on the 1951 RLA amendments, see supra notes 76-79 and
accompanying text.
233. Burley, 325 U.S. at 739.
234. Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Id.

74

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:27

upon a single common issue or cause of dispute arising from the terms
of a collective [bargaining] agreement."237 As the Burley Court as
serted in a footnote on this point, "[t]o give the collective agent power
to make the agreement, but exclude it from any voice whatever in its
interpretation would go far toward destroying its uniform applica
tion."238 A satisfactory procedure must permit, to the extent that in
terpretation of the governing collective bargaining agreement is an
issue, the exclusive agent to actively participate in the settlement in
order to preserve the agreement's uniform interpretation and
application.
In summary, Burley presents at least three principles relevant to
the minority union representation right at the company level: (1) a
minority union employee is limited to exclusive majority union repre
sentation in major disputes; this limitation does not apply as a general
rule to minor disputes; (2) a conflict of interests between the employee
and the majority union may make compulsory majority union repre
sentation unfair; (3) finally, while a minor dispute may be "individual"
in nature, its resolution may affect the majority union by its prospec
tive impact on other employees' future claims. The following section
employs these principles as the basis of a proposed minor dispute rep
resentation scheme embodying the spirit and letter of the RLA.
V.

A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF INDIVIDUAL.
EMPLOYEES' MINORITY UNION REPRESENTATION
RIGHTS AT THE COMPANY LEVEL
UNDER THE RLA

A.

A Three-Step Test for Establishing the Respective
Representation Rights of the Minority Union Employee
and the Majority Union: An Application of the
Burley Principles

The three principles espoused in Burley, which this note suggests
are relevant to grievance resolution at the company level, invite a
three-step test which can be applied to a dispute in determining the
respective representation rights of the minority union employee and
the majority union in resolving that dispute. 239 The test is comprised
at 737.
at 737 n.35.
The diagram (see infra Figure 1) illustrates the proposed three-step test for de
termining the respective representation rights of the minority union employee and the ma
jority union in resolving disputes under the Railway Labor Act.
This test is derived from the Burley decision's general description of the statutory
(RLA) and equitable foundation of the relationship between the individual employee and
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
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of three sequential inquiries aimed at ascertaining the interests of the
parties involved and permitting representation on the basis of the na
ture of the interests at stake in each dispute.
The first inquiry is whether the dispute is a major or minor dis
pute. If the grievance constitutes a major dispute, Burley strongly sug
gests, and this scheme proposes, that the minority union employee's
right to minority union representation is foreclosed. 24O If the griev
ance presents a minor dispute, the minority union employee's repre
sentation rights are determined in the second and third steps.
The second question is whether the minority union employee and
the majority union concur on the disposition to be sought from the
dispute resolution process. If the employee and the majority union
agree on the desired result, the majority union will serve as the em
ployee's exclusive representative and the employee is not entitled to
minority union representation at the company level. Even where the
employee is limited to majority union representation, he or she retains
the right to participate individually. When the interests of the em
ployee and the majority union conflict, however, and they seek dispa
rate results, the likelihood of prejudice identified in Burley dictates
that the employee's rights are only adequately protected by permitting
minority union representation. 241
The third and final inquiry is whether the dispute involves deter
mination of the parties' conformity with the governing collective bar
gaining agreement. Even when the employee is entitled to minority
union representation, if the dispute involves an issue of the parties'
(employer, majority union, or employee) conformity with the collec
tive bargaining agreement, the majority union's interest in uniform ap
plication of the agreement requires that it be entitled to participate as
an equal third party-with the employer and the employee-in resolv
ing the dispute. Where conformity is not in question, however, the
majority union's participation is limited to the right to be present and
the majority union. Step (1) acknowledges the distinction, identified in Burley, between
major and minor disputes. Step (2) is an adaptation of Professor Summers' differentiation
of grievances. Summers, supra note 195, at 399. Step (3) is a reconstruction of Bernard
Dunau's recommendations for permitting active participation of the parties in a grievance
resolution proceeding according to the particular interests at stake. Dunau, Employee Par
ticipation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 747
(1950).
240. For a discussion of the first step in the proposed analysis, see infra notes 243-.68
and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion ofthe second step in the proposed analysis, see infra notes 269
80 and accompanying text.
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to be heard. 242 The following discussion describes each step in greater
detail.
1.

Does the Minority Union Member's Claim Constitute a
"Major" or a "Minor" Dispute?243

It is settled law that all rights of an individual to a minority union
representative or individual participation in a labor dispute are fore
closed where it is determined that the dispute is "major." Before an
employee can claim a right to minority union representation, there
fore, it must be established that the claim presents a minor dispute.
The classification of a dispute as "major" or "minor" determines the
nature of the procedures to be used in its resolution. 244 The different
procedures triggered by the two types of disputes, in turn, provide the
parties with different rights. 245 While representation is among the
rights affected by the classification, federal cases have also addressed
the distinction between types of disputes in order to determine juris
242. For a discussion of the third step in the proposed analysis, see infra notes 281
98 and accompanying text.
243. For an illustration of this determination's implications and position in the
proposed scheme, see supra note 239, step 1, and accompanying text. The focus ofthis note
is the representation rights of minority union employees in minor disputes. As a result, the
core of its analysis lies .in determination of representation entitlements after the
classification of disputes as either "major" or "minor" has been made. While the
discussion which follows regarding differentiation between major and minor disputes is not
an exhaustive review of pertinent judicial decisions, the issue is addressed as significant
because it remains very relevant to an employee who desires to process a grievance which
bears characteristics of both types of disputes. In such an instance, before a dispute can be
channeled into the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism, the majority union and
individual employee must resolve the threshold question of classification. For a discussion
of practical considerations in executing this threshold determination, see infra notes 244-68
and accompanying text.
244. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 703-04
(7th Cir. 1987). When the dispute is major, the RLA provides th/!t the parties "must at
tempt to. resolve it through negotiation, mediation and possible presidential intervention."
Id. at 704 (citing Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378, reh'g denied, 394
U.S. 1024 (1969». "If a dispute is minor, the parties first must attempt to resolve their
dispute through negotiation. If negotiation fails, however, the parties must submit their
minor dispute to the National Railway Adjustment Board for resolution." Id. (citing Na
tional Ry. Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
830 F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1987». The NRAB exercises exclusive jurisdiction over minor
disputes. Id. (citing Andrews v. Louisville and N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972) (citation
omitted».
245. Id. at 703-04. When the parties fail to resolve a major dispute, the union is
entitled to strike. National Ry. Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, 830 F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1987). Employees cannot strike in re
sponse to a minor dispute. Chicago and N. W. Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Electri
cal Workers, Local Union No. 214, 829 F.2d 1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1987); Brotherhood of
R.R. Signalmen v. Burlington N. R.R., 829 F.2d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 1987).
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diction over disputes 246 and availability to a union of state tort law
causes of action against an employer. 247 Considering this issue in con
texts not involving representation rights is useful in providing a clearer
definition of when an employee can enjoy minority union
representation.
Although the distinction between major and minor disputes is
critical in applying the RLA, courts and commentators agree that the
dividing line is vague. 248 Generally, courts follow Burley and differen
tiate disputes by identifying a minor dispute as "a dispute over inter
pretation of an existing contract" and a major dispute as "an attempt
to create a contract or change the terms of a contract. "249 At least one
court has recognized, however, that while the Burley differentiation
may have been an adequate standard when unions were organizing for
the first time, its usefulness diminished as unions and railroads renego
tiated existing agreements. 250 After Burley, courts have frequently
faced the difficult factual question of whether in engaging in questiona
ble conduct, railroads "changed the conditions of work," suggesting a
major dispute, or "infringed upon a right guaranteed the union under
the agreement," suggesting a minor dispute. 251 In response to this di
lemma, the courts refined the Burley distinction to give greater defini
tion to the dividing line between the two classes of disputes.
Some courts have focused on the dichotomy between statutory
246. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 833 F.2d at 703. Norfolk and Western Rail
way (N & W) implemented urinalysis drug screening in all of its routine employee medical
examinations. The unions charged in federal district court that the screening program con
stituted an "unlawful unilateral change in the employees' 'working conditions' in violation
of ... the Railway Labor Act." Id. The unions claimed that the district court hadjurisdic
tion in this instance because it involved a "major dispute." On N & W's motion for sum
mary judgment, the district court determined that the dispute was minor and within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB. The court of appeals affirmed. Id.
247. Leu v. Norfolk and w. Ry., 820 F.2d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 1987). In Leu, former
employees sued Norfolk and Western Ry. claiming that the railroad engaged in fraud and
conversion in not paying the employees' medical expenses. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and held that the employer's duty to pay medical bills was to be determined from the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, gave rise to a minor dispute. The
RLA's minor dispute resolution mechanism preempts any state law claims. Id. at 827-30.
248. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 711-28 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S.
661 (1946); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21,30-37 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963). McGuinn, Injunctive Powers o/the Federal Courts
in Cases Involving Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 50 GEO. L.J. 46, 55-73 (1961).
249. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 833 F.2d at 704 (citing Chicago and N. W.
Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 214, 829 F.2d
1424, 1427 (7th Cir. 1987) and Burley, 325 U.S. at 723).
250. Local 553 v. Eastern Air Lines, 695 F.2d 668, 673 (2d Cir. 1982).
251. Id.
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rights and rights arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. In
International Ass'n ofMachinists and Aerospace Workers v. Alaska Air
lines,252 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[m]ajor dis
putes concern statutory rights, such as the right to form collective
bargaining agreements or to seek to secure new rights and incorporate
them into future agreements" while minor disputes "concern the inter
pretation or application of collective bargaining agreements. "253
Other courts have turned almost exclusively to the contents of the
collective bargaining agreement to determine the classification of a dis
pute. Under this approach, the-court considers whether "the dispute
can be resolved by reference to an existing collective [bargaining]
agreement."254 When it can clearly be so resolved, it is a minor dis
pute. When the determination cannot be easily made, the court con
siders "the [railroad's] claims of contractual justification" for its
challenged activity.255 If the employer's claims are "frivolous" or "ob
viously insubstantial," the dispute is major. 256 In contrast, "a dispute
is minor [when the collective bargaining agreement] is 'reasonably sus
ceptible' to the carrier's interpretation."257
In scrutinizing collective bargaining agreements to assess whether
they are material to a dispute, courts have found that some written
agreements do not contain all relevant working conditions. 258 As a
result, the court cannot render a decision, classifying a dispute as
either major or minor, based solely on the express language of the
agreement. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed
in Labor Executives Association v. Norfolk and Western Railway,259
however, "it is common practice [in the railroad industry] to omit
from written agreements nonessential practices that are acceptable to
252. 813 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 290 (1987).
253. Id. at 1039-40 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 776
F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1985».
254. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 833 F.2d at 704.
255. Id.
256. Atchison, T., and S. F. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 734 F.2d 317, 321 (7th
Cir. 1984). Cases of this nature reveal a pattern in which the employer seeks characteriza
tion of the dispute as a "minor dispute" primarily to avoid work stoppages and challenges
in the courts. The unions and employees, on the other hand, frequently seek a finding that
the dispute is major, permitting their resort to self-help measure such as strikes. Local 553,
695 F.2d at 675; Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 705
(7th Cir. 1987).
257. Local 553, 695 F.2d at 673 (citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United Transp.
Union, 491 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974».
258. Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142,
153-54 (1969).
259. 833 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R. v.
United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 153-55 (1969».
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both parties."260 In such instances, courts infer that the collective
agreement includes "the specific terms set forth in the written agree
ment and any well established practices that constitute a 'course of
dealing' between the carrier and employees."261 In considering the
employer's assertions that the agreement justifies its challenged activ
ity or forbearance, the court must rely not only on the written lan
guage of the agreenient but on those terms which can be inferred from
"course of dealing." At least one court has stretched the scope of in
ferred provisions of the agreement from which minor disputes can
arise to include an "incident of the employment relationship."262
In Detroit and Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. United Transporta
tion Union,263 the Supreme Court identified yet another means of dis
tinguishing major and minor disputes. The Court, as interpreted by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Local 553 v.. Eastern Air
Lines,264 looked to "the extent of the disruption caused by the carrier's
action; in a literal sense, it looked to see whether the dispute was ma
jor."26S The Local 553 court observed that this manner of regarding
disputes is consistent with Burley. Citing Burley, the Local 553 court
noted that Congress intended the major dispute process to apply to
" 'the large issues about which strikes ordinarily arise,' while the com
pulsory arbitration" mechanisms were established for minor disputes
" '[b]ecause of their comparatively minor character and the general
improbability of their causing interruption of peaceful relations and of
traffic.' "266 This contour of the major and minor dispute dichotomy
promotes the presumption adopted in Brotherhood of Locomotive En
gineers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. CO..267 In that case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that because "a major dispute can
escalate into a strike," when there is doubt as to whether a dispute is
major or minor, a court will find the dispute to be minor.268
260. Id. at 705.
261. Id. (citing Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 153-55). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, noted that the past practices between employees and
employer may have minimal impact on the characterization of the dispute as major or
minor, particularly where it is used to contradict the contents of the written agreement.
Brotherhood Ry. Carmen v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 745 F.2d 370, 376-78 (6th Cir. 1984).
262. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 430 F.2d 994, 996
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
263. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
264. 695 F.2d 668, 674 (2d Cir. 1983).
265. Id. at 674 (citing Detroit and Toledo Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 143-51).
266. Id. (quoting Burley, 325 U.S. at 723-24).
267. 768 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1985).
268. Id. at 920.
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Determining Representation Rights in Minor Disputes: Do
the Individual Employee and the Majority Union
Seek the Same Result or Do Their Interests
Confiict?269

As suggested in Burley, minor disputes which involve employee
grievances or disciplinary matters are reasonably divisible into two
categories. The first category consists of claims which the collective
bargaining agent supports and for which it will seek a disposition con
sonant with individual employees' objectives regardless of their minor
ity union affiliations. The other category encompasses grievances
toward which the collective agent is hostile and in which it cannot
support the individual employee. This latter category also includes
those grievances about which the majority union harbors reservations
or retains an uncommitted stance. 270 The relationship between indi
vidual and collective interests in these two general categories is suffi
ciently different to justify maintaining a difference of representation
rights in each category.
In the first instance, where a majority union supports the minor
ity union employee's grievance, permitting the majority union· to serve
as the employee's representative, in spite of the employee's objections,
is justified because there is a negligible impact on the employee's abil
ity to realize the desired objective. It must be recognized, neverthe
less, that the individual may prefer another representative for several
reasons. There may be a general distrust of the union or apprehension
that the union's efforts will be faint. The employee may strongly dis
like the collective agent or merely prefer that the minority union re
ceive the credit when the claim is resolved. Th~se reasons, however,
do not overcome the interests of the majority in having the collective
agent actively manage the claim when the collective agent agrees with
. the merits of the claim. In addition, it is more efficient to allow the
collective agent, who is more familiar with the governing agreement,
to handle the dispute.
To deny the collective agent a role as representative in minor dis
putes at the personal whim of an individual is likely to "undermine the
prestige" of the majority union. 271 By regular prosecution of griev
ances, the majority union continuously "demonstrate[s] its effective
269.
proposed
270.
271.

For an illustration of this determination's implications and position in the
scheme, see supra note 239, step 2, and accompanying text.
Summers, supra note 195, at 399; see also Burley, 325 U.S. at 736.
Summers, supra note 195, at 398.

82

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:27

ness as guardian of the employee's interests."272 Successful settlement
of disputes permits the union to "build[ ] bonds of loyalty" with the
employees it benefits and to preserve the confidence of its members. 273
The participation of another representative less familiar with griev
ance procedures under the governing collective bargaining agreement
may increase the administrative burdens and costs to all the parties
involved. Employer apprehension about antagonizing a majority
union as it deals with a minority representative for the affected craft
may even cause an unfavorable result for the employee. Total subju
gation of the majority union to the desires of the indiyidual may
weaken the authority of the collective agent in major disputes and; in
tum, deprive all employees of a collective voice.
Balancing the interests involved suggests that the collective agent
and individual employee are best served by requiring the employee to
submit the grievance to the collective agent for representation through
the entirety of company-level proceedings when the agent and em
ployee agree on the desired result. The individual's reservations about
the adequacy of the representation can be appeased by observing the
employee's statutory right to be present at hearings and to personally
contribute to them. 274
While Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.275 established the "duty of
fair representation" in the handling of major disputes, the Court, in
Conley v. Gibson,276 extended the doctrine to minor disputes. The
Court held that even when the exclusive collective agent has satisfied
its fair representation duty in the creation of the collective bargaining
contract, the contract may not be "administered in such a way, with
the active or tacit consent of the [majority] union, as to be flagrantly
discriminatory against some members of the bargaining unit."277 To
gether, the duty of fair representation and the requirement that the
individual and the majority union concur on the desired dispute reso
lution provide individual employees with considerable assurance that
their grievances will be pursued by the exclusive agent with fervor
when the exclusive agent represents them.
As the Burley Court noted, however, there are factual instances in
which the interests of an individual and those of a majority union con
272. Id. at 391.
273. Id.
274. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1982). For text of § 152, Fourth, see supra note 60.
275. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). For a discussion of Steele, see supra notes 193-95 and
accompanying text.
276. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
277. Id. at 46.
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ftict, such as when the union favors an employee other than the griev
ant in a seniority claim. Even the fair representation doctrine cannot
assure the employee of a wholeheartedly supportive representative
under these circumstances. The disfavored employee's seniority claim
is probably destined for failure at the outset.
When a collective agent is opposed to an employee's grievance, is
not committed to the employee's cause, or favors competing griev
ances submitted by other employees, adhering to a rule requiring ma
jority union representation is tantamount to no representation. A
collective agent may disbelieve an employee's statement of facts, disa
gree with the employee's interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, or may be personally or politically opposed to the griev
ant.278 Under any of these factual circumstances, the union either
does not seek the same result or the employee cannot be assured of
having a fervent representative. In these cases, only allowing the
grievant to choose a representative can preserve a semblance of fair
ness in the process. 279
The collective bargaining agreement, however, must always be
observed to the extent that it lays out the procedural mechanism
through which the grievance must pass. If the majority union decides
early in the process that it does not concur with the individual's con
tentions, that is the point at which the employee's entitlement to mi
nority union representation arises. The minority union, however,
must proceed through all the steps delineated in the collective bargain
ing agreement up through the last appeals stage at the company level.
Preserving the integrity of the process, even as representatives vary,
"simplifies the administrative work of management; provides the max
imum opportunity for settlement; and helps insure that the substantive
terms of the settlements will be uniform. "280
3.

To What Extent Can the Exclusive Agent Participate in
the Minor Dispute Resolution Process to Protect Its
Own Interests and Those of the Majority as
a Collective Unit?281

Where it is determined that the employee is entitled to minority
278. Summers, supra note 195, at 399.
279. For a discussion of the practical considerations in determining congruity or in
congruity between the individual employee's interests and those of the majority union, see
infra subsection 2, "Implementation Considerations."
280. Summers, supra note 195, at 399-400.
281. For an illustration of this determination's implications and position in the
proposed scheme, see supra note 239, step 3, and accompanying text.

84

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 11:27

union representation, the question to be posed is whether the majority
union, nonetheless, retains a right to participate in resolving the claim.
In the aforementioned seniority claim, for example, the majority union
may favor the appointment of employees other than the claimant. The
collective unit may be impacted prospectively in future claims by reso
lution of the current dispute. 282 Even though under the proposed
scheme the employee would be entitled to minority union representa
tion because the collective and .individual interests are inconsistent, the
majority union's interest in the outcome of each grievance adjustment
cannot be ignored. A satisfactory procedure in minor disputes im
pacting the majority must address the interests of three parties: the
individual, the employer, and th~ collective agent.~~3
Although NLRA section 159(a)284 does not recognize an em
ployee's right to minority union representation in -the adjustment of
grievances unless contemplated in the collective bargaining agree
ment,285 the provision expressly recognizes the employee's in~lividual
282. Determination of one employee's seniority status in a grievance hearing may
affect the seniority status of other employees adversely. Without- representation in the pro
ceedings, these other employees would only be able to assert their objections and concerns
in a subsequent proceeding and, possibly, with a lesser chance of achieving a satisfactory
result.

283. Eigin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661
(1946), recognized that despite the individual nature of a grievance claim- between an em
ployee and the employer, the majority union cannot be excluded from participation in its
resolution:
To leave [grievance] settlements ... ultimately to the several choices of the
members, each according to his own desire without regard to the- effect upon the
collective interest, would mean that each affected worker would have the right to
choose his own terms and to determine the meaning and effect of the collective
agreement for himself .... To give the collective agent power to make the agree
ment, but exclude it from any voice ... in its interpretation would go far toward
destroying its uniform application.
Burley, 325 U.S. at 737 n.35.
284. NLRA § 159(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain- .
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their 
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be pres
ent at such adjustment. 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
.
285. A significant difference between the RLA and the NLRA is that while at least
some minority union representation is permitted under the RLA, the NLRA generally
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standing to present grievances and to have them adjusted. It also ac
knowledges and protects the majority union's interest in resolving
precludes presentation of grievances "through any labor organization other than the exclu
sive representative." Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981,982 (1944), enforced as modified,
147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). The NLRA permits an employee to enlist a minority union to
present a grievance only with the consent pf both the employer and the collective agent.
Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Wholesale, Dept. Store Union, 173 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir.
1949). On its face, the current interpretation of the NLRA bears a strong resemblance to
the RLA interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court in Landers, which relies entirely on
the governing collective bargaining agreement to determine whether an employee may en
joy any minority union representation in minor disputes.
While the two statutes share a common concern for the ability of an individual to
bring grievances before an employer without influence or coercion by the exclusive agent,
they are fundamentally different on the question of minority unions and the degree of pro
tection extended to the exclusive agent. The eras and the conditions from which each
statute arose explain their differences. Arouca, Perritt, Transponation Labor Regulation: Is
the Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act the Better Statutory Vehicle?, 36
LAB. L.J. 145, 147 (1985). Dennis Arouca and Professor Henry Perritt find that "[t]he
RLA was intended to be a very loose legal framework within which most controversies
would be adjusted voluntarily." Id. "The NLRA," in contrast, "was intended to be a
much tighter and more detailed set of obligations that would be explicated and applied by
legal institutions." Id.
Congress enacted the RLA as drafted and proposed by railroads and the unions. It
codified practices born out of economic conditions and traditions prevalent in 1926. Id. at
149. As Justice Brennan indicated in his dissenting opinion in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
United Transp. Union: The intent of Congress was "not to write a lot of statute law for the
courts to ~nforce . . .. We expect that most of the provisions of this bill are to be enforced
by the power of persuasion, either exercised by the parties themselves or by the Govern
ment board of mediation representing the public interest." 402 U.S. 570, 590 (1971) (Bren
nan, J., dissenting) .(quoting Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes be/ore House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. 7180, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, 66 (1926».
Congress enacted the NLRA, on the other hand, in 1935, a time when labor relied on
legislation rather than economic and political persuasion to gain a footing in its dealings
with industry. D. Arouca, supra, at 148-50. The NLRA legislation focused on promoting
collective bargaining and strengthening the selected collective agent. Id.
Arouca and Perritt suggest that the RLA is tailored after the British "abstentionist"
labor model practiced in Britain at the time of the RLA's enactment. Id. at 147. Under the
British model, "[t]he problem of union recognition ... was ... left to the parties to re
solve-the law did nothing to make it incumbent on any employer to bargain with a union
or any union to bargain with an employer." Id. at 148. The result, they indicate, was that
"multiunionism," the absence of an exclusive agent, became prevalent. Id. If the British
model even slightly influenced the RLA's development, a statutory interpretation of the
RLA accepting a limited minority union role in grievance dispute resolution appears more
consistent with the statute's spirit than one which gives complete dominion to the collective
. agent.
While the courts have determined that the NLRA requires consent of both the em
ployer and the collective agent before a minority union can engage in grievance matters,
commentators have observed that the core difference between the NLRA and the RLA is
the degree of exclusivity of representation rights afforded under each to the collective agent.
It would seem anomalous, therefore, to interpret the RLA as identical to the NLRA on the
issue of minority union representation.
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grievances. 286 In these respects, the NLRA is analogous to the RLA.
Although the NLRA lacks detail in laying out the respective roles of
employees, majority union, and employer, the RLA brings even less
specificity to this subject. The NLRA guarantees the collective agent
a role in the grievance process even when the agent is not representing
the grievant. The scope of that role, however, is unclear. While the
NLRA speaks of the majority union's right to "an opportunity to be
present,"287 at least one commentator has suggested that language be
interpreted to provide for a more meaningful role. 288
Bernard Dunau suggests that, under the NLRA and the RLA,
the exclusive agent has a right to be heard in all grievance proceedings
and that the exclusive agent should be able to intervene if the collec
tive bargaining agreement's integrity or uniform application is
threatened. 289 He proposes a three-party adjustment procedure within
which all three parties retain equal shares in decision-making to the
extent that the grievance involves the question of "consistency with
the agreement."290 If the grievance does not involve conformity with
the collective agreement, or if there is no question of agreement inter
pretation, or the outstanding issue is merely one of a factual determi
nation, only the employer and the employee must agree in order to
reach a final resolution. 291 Likewise, where conformity with the col
lective agreement is not an issue, a deadlock can be the result only if
the employer and the employee cannot agree. The exclusive agent's
concurrence is not essential to resolve a dispute. Dunau would place
the burden of determining whether consistency with the collective
agreement is threatened upon the exclusive agent itself.292 The possi
Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect 0/ Collective Bargaining,
L. REV., 731, 745 (1950).
287. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). For text of § 159(a) see supra note 284.
288. Dunau, supra note 286, at 746-47.
289. Id. at 747.
290. Id. at 748.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 747. Professor Dunau notes:
The necessity for this conclusion is apparent from a consideration of the rea
son for and the scope of intervention. On its face the right of intervention is
bottomed on the need to maintain the integrity and uniformity of the agreement,
for the protection of which the representative's participation in conference with
out more is insufficient. To be meaningful, intervention must enlarge on the al
ready existing right to be heard, but to prevent displacement of the employee's
power of decision, it must encompass less than exclusive authority to settle the
grievance on the employee's behalf. The middle ground is to grant the represen
tative and the employee an equal voice in determining the question of conformity.
On this basis, although the right to intervene adheres as soon as the issue of con
formity is raised, disposition of a grievance, insofar as the requirement of con
286.

50

COLUM.
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bility·of a tripartite deadlock between employer, employee, and major
ity union where the claim involves conformity with the collective
bargaining agreement, or a bipartite deadlock between employer and
employee where the collective bargaining agreement is not an issue,
underscores the need for an effective grievance adjustment process es
tablished by collective bargaining agreement. Incorporating neutral
arbitration as a final stage precludes the deadlocks which might
arise.293
The third step of the proposed representation scheme parallels
Dunau's model. The major difference is the proposal's recognition of
minority union representation where Dunau merely recognizes indi
vidual employee participation. Disputes, in which an employee is enti
tled to minority union representation as a result of determinations in
the previous two steps in the analysis, are further divisible into two
groups in this third and final step.294 The first group consists of those
disputes in which conformity of the parties (employee and employer)
with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement is an issue. The
other group encompasses disputes in which conformity with the col
lective bargaining agreement is not an issue.
Where conformity with the agreement arises,295 the majority
union has a strong interest in the agreement's uniform application and,
therefore, should be entitled to actively participate in company-level
negotiations as the third of three equal parties, all of whom must agree
in a proposed resolution for the dispute to reach settlement. This tri
partite procedure ensures that dispute resolution in the case of a mi
nority union employee will be consistent with the rights and benefits of
majority union employees.
In contrast, there may be no question of conformity with the col
lective bargaining agreement. Such is the case when the dispute in
volves application of well-settled interpretations of the agreement's
pertinent provisions and the issues lie primarily in determination of
facts. As Dunau suggests,296 the dispute arises primarily in the em
formity with the terms of agreement is concerned, requires the tripartite
agreement of the employer, the employee, and the representative.
Id. at 747.
293. Id. at 749.
294. For an illustration of the steps in the proposed representation scheme, see supra
note 239.
295. Conformity with the agreement is likely to arise where the employee and em
ployer disagree on interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. As a party to the
collective bargaining agreement, the majority union has a substantial interest in participa
tion in negotiations which will result in a settled interpretation.
296. Dunau, supra note 286, at 740-51.
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ployer-employee relationship. The majority union's interest, which is
limited to the union's status as a party of the collective bargaining
agreement, does not rise to a level justifying the majority union's full
participation in the dispute resolution process. The proposed scheme
adopts Dunau's premise by excluding the majority union to the extent
that dispute resolution in these cases requires agreement only between
the employer and employee or the employee's minority union repre
sentative. The majority union, however, is not eliminated entirely. It
retains the right to be present and witness the proceedings as well as to
voice its concerns and recommendations. The employer and em
ployee, nonetheless, may reject any majority union arguments as long
as conformity with the agreement is not involved. If at any point in
the proceedings interpretation of the agreement is necessary, the ma
jority union's status in the proceedings rises such that the majority
union becomes an equal deciding participant as to the "conformity"
question.
The RLA encourages employers, employees, and exclusive agents
to reach mutually satisfactory resolutions. RLA section 152, First im
poses the duty on "all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to
... settle all disputes."297 Where it appears, therefore, that the major
ity union and the employer are acting in collusion to deny the em
ployee and the minority union representative a satisfactory settlement,
the provisions of section 152, First may give the minority union em
ployee a cause of action in federal court. 298

B. Implementation Considerations
Parcelling the right of representation at the company level based
on the nature of the interests of the parties involved raises implemen
tation issues. The proposed scheme, however, is not impractical. An
individual employee initiates a claim by submitting details of the griev
ance to the majority union, including mention of his or her choice of
representation. The collective agent considers the facts and develops
its own, albeit informal, assessment of the merits of the claim. Driven
297.

45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1982). RLA section 152, First provides:

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert

every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the
application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between
the carrier and the employees thereof.
45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1982).
298. See id.
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by the fair representation doctrine, the majority union bears a respon
sibility to reach a good faith decision concerning its ability to assume
the representation role without any conflict ofinterest.299 The union's
concession that it disapproves of a grievant's claim, combined with an
employee's desire to be represented by the minority union, should jus
tify terminating the relationship between the employee and the major
ity union as a potential representative in that particular grievance.
Forcing a continued relationship between the minority union em
ployee and an unsympathetic collective agent disrupts the balance be
tween collective and individual interests mandated by the RLA.
C.

Consistency with the Letter of the RLA

While this representation scheme strikes the delicate balance be
tween the multiple interests contemplated by the spirit of the RLA, it
also satisfies the express statutory language of the statute. Section 152,
Second requires that all disputes be "considered, and, if possible, de
cided ... between representatives ... interested in the dispute."3oo A
malleable approach of allocating the representation right between the
majority and minority unions, as a function of the specific interests at
stake for the employee and the exclusive agent in each dispute, guaran
tees that representatives participating in the resolution process share
the interests of the parties whom they represent.
The proposed representation scheme is also consistent with the
language of section 152, Third, which bars interference with an em
ployee's choice of representation. 301 Interpreting the RLA to permit
minority union representation in minor disputes when a collective
agent does not wholeheartedly support the employee's claim prevents
the employer and the majority union from systematically forcing an
itidividual to accept the unsympathetic majority union's representa
tion. When the quality of representation rests on the discretion of an
aloof collective agent, the individual cannot be assured of meaningful
and fervent representation. Finally, the duty of fair representation in
herent in the RLA is observed by precluding majority union represen
tation in instances where conflicts of interest exist between the
individual and the majority union.
The RLA's union shop provisions also suggest a congressional
299. A decision by the exclusive agent to profess concurrence with the employee
witb an undisclosed intent to compromise the employee's objectives in negotiations with
the employer may constitute a violation of the duty of fair representation. See generally
Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
300. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1982). For text of § 152, Second, see supra note 65.
301. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1982). For text of § 152, Third, see supra note 68.
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intent to recognize limited minority union representation roles at the
company level. Section 152, Eleventh(a) requires employees to join a
union, but membership in any nationally recognized and certified la
bor union satisfies the requirement. 302 It appears that Congress sought
to compensate the employee for the unusually rigid membership re
quirements by granting somewhat expanded minority union represen
tation rights. Refusing to recognize minority union representation
rights at the company level denies the employee any tangible benefit of
choosing, as section 152, Eleventh(c) allows, membership in a minor
ity union. 303 Although the employee receives the benefit of minority
union representation in final proceedings before the NRAB, denying
minority union representation earlier in the process reduces company
level procedures to meaningless administrative steps toward an NRAB
hearing or a court proceeding. Since the essence of the statute is the
maximization of effective negotiations between employees and rail
roads, the early stages of negotiations must remain productive.
CONCLUSION

The landmark Railway Labor Act case of Elgin, Joliet & Eastern
Railway Co. v. Burley 304 adjudicated the exclusive representation issue
in the context of proceedings before the NRAB.305 It identified ge
neric principles of individual employee rights vis a vis the unions
which are applicable to analogous company-level hearings. Imple
menting a mechanism which allows minority union employees, based
on the incongruity of their claims with the interests of the collective
agent, to be represented by their own union at a grievance hearing
while permitting a majority union to be present and to participate ac
tively, proportionately with the degree to which the fate of the major
ity is involved, would be consistent with Burley and with the letter and
spirit of the RLA. All concerned would have a voice.
The recent Supreme Court decision in 'Landers v. NationalRail
road Passengers Corp. 306 deviates from the equitable principles of RLA
interpretation expounded in Burley. Landers denies minority union
representation to an employee in company-level grievance or discipli
302.
note 72.
303.
note 73.
304.
305.
306.

45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(a) (1982). For text of § 152, Eleventh(a), see supra
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(c) (1982). For text of § 152, Eleventh(c), see supra
325 U.S. 711, 738 (1945), adhered to, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
Id. at 738.
108 S. Ct. 1440 (1988).
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nary proceedings. 307 Landers focuses on protection of the majority
union's exclusive representative status, citing selective RLA provisions
and policy considerations. 308 The Court relied on the availability of
such representation at later stages of the grievance process to protect
the employee treated inequitably at the company level. Landers ex
pressly rejects the view espoused in Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co. 309 by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Taylor court found
that the RLA grants an individual the authority to present any indi
vidual claim to his or her employer through a minority union. To
categorically deny, however, either an individual employee, as Landers
does, or the majority, as Taylor would, the right of representation at a
company-level hearing, denigrates the proceeding such that it becomes
a meaningless step toward a proceeding before the NRAB or a court
where the parties' rights are truly observed. Both approaches dimin
ish the value of negotiations and run afoul of one of the foundations of
the RLA, the requirement that "[a]U disputes between a carrier or
carriers and its or their employees shall be considered, and if possible,
decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives
designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or
carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute. "310
Fernando A. Ruiz

307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 1442.
Id. at 1442-44.
794 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 670 (1986).
45 U.S.c. § 152, Second (1982). For text of § 152, Second, see supra note 65.

